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INTRODUCTION

Corporate law has been forced to confront its political side.
Throughout the twentieth century, scholars focused on fiduciary duties,
agency costs, and social efficiency in their analysis of the corporation.
While the relationships amongst executives, directors, and shareholders
were subject to close scrutiny, the most direct relationship-namely, the
shareholders' election of directors-was taken for granted, a required
but largely uncontroversial (and inconsequential) annual exercise in
democracy. The ramifications of this were well understood: the
separation between ownership and control is foundational to the field.'
But this lack of accountability on the part of elected officials to their
constituents was to be addressed through shareholder suits, securities
regulation, or tender offers. The possibility for electoral oversight was
largely assumed to be impossible.
However, a convergence of economic, demographic, and legal
forces has created the new world of "shareholder democracy." The
growth of institutional shareholders has been accompanied by their
interest in exercising collective power to oversee management. As part
of their oversight, these shareholders are taking their voting rights
seriously.
Difficulties in exercising this power still remain, and
shareholder democracy advocates have an array of proposals designed
to make their voting rights more effective. 2 But, as one set of
commentators has noted, "[n]ever has voting been more important in
'3
corporate law."
The new importance vested in corporate democratic processes has
raised the stakes for the construction of the polity. Lopsided voting
arrangements that give a small minority disproportionate power have
come under increasing scrutiny. 4 Just as "one person, one vote"
resonates with fairness for the average American, the phrase "one share,
1 The seminal work is ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). Their work on the separation of ownership and
control has arguably led to much of the later work in the field. Cf Edward B. Rock & Michael L.
Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U.
PA. L. REV. 1619, 1624 (2001) ("It was as if everyone already knew (from Berle and Means) that
the master problem of corporate law was agency costs, and along came an economic model and a
vocabulary to elaborate that view.").
2 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Casefor IncreasingShareholder Power, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 833 (2005).
3 Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting 2 (Univ. of Pa.
Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 07-18, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1007065.
4 See, e.g., Times Investors Urged to Take Stand, CNNMONEY.COM, Apr. 5, 2007,
http://money.cnn.com/2007/04/05/news/companies/nytimes- board/?postversion=2007040512
(discussing concerns over dual-class ownership structure at the New York Times Co.).

2008]

ONE SHARE, ONE VOTE

one vote" provides a powerful slogan for shareholder governance in our
corporate law. 5 The phrase is appealing because it provides a system of
governance based on a reductive but equitable distribution: each unit
shall have the same power of control over the organization. "One share,
one vote" has been described as "[t]he most basic statutory rule of
[corporate] voting ' 6 as well as consistent with "[d]emocratic intuition
[and] liberal tradition."'7 Although the standard is simply a default rule
in most jurisdictions, most publicly traded companies have adopted it,
8
and it remains the presumptive norm.
Corporate law scholars generally accept the "one share, one vote"
standard as the basis for efficient distribution of the corporation's voting
rights. 9 According to the theory, shareholders have the right to control
the corporation because they own the rights to the residual interest in
the corporation (i.e., its profits). Because all other stakeholders in the
corporation--employees, suppliers, and customers-are entitled to their
contractual claims before profits are paid, shareholders are in the best
position to maximize the overall wealth generated by the corporation. 10
The notion that shareholder interests should be pursued as the ultimate
ends of the corporation is known as shareholder primacy theory, or the
shareholder wealth maximization norm." The shareholder franchise is
5 The standard of "one share, one vote" was ensconced in American corporate practice by
the New York Stock Exchange in 1926. For a discussion of the New York Stock Exchange rule,
see Joel Seligman, Stock Exchange Rules Affecting Takeovers and Control Transactions, in
KNIGHTS, RAIDERS & TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 465, 468-73 (John C.
Coffee, Jr., Louis Lowenstein & Susan Rose-Ackerman eds., 1988). More importantly (for our
purposes), corporate scholars have argued that the "one share, one vote" corporate voting
structure offers the best structure for maximizing social utility. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 73 (1991).
6 Id. at 72.
7 Colleen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the Corporation:Insightsfrom the History of
Shareholder Voting Rights, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1367 (2006) (quoting Caroline
Fohlin, The History of Corporate Ownership and Control in Germany, in A HISTORY OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD: FAMILY BUSINESS GROUPS TO PROFESSIONAL
MANAGERS 223, 262 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2005) (alteration to the original).
8 ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 361 (1986).
The standard has been
increasingly popular in European states. See Guido Ferrarini, One Share--One Vote: A
European Rule? 22 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 58/2006,
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-878664 ("[T]he law and practice in European
countries is slowly converging towards Anglo-American corporate governance standards,
including one share--one vote."). And European Union officials have pushed corporations
toward "one share, one vote" in order to "eliminate discriminatory treatment of shareholders."
Tobias Buck, EU Seeks to End Bias Among Investors: Commission Wants 'One Share, One Vote'
Principle, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 17, 2005, at 1 (quoting the European Union's internal
market commissioner Charlie McCreevy).
9 Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775, 777 (2005)
("[S]cholars have not seriously challenged the theoretical underpinnings of the dominant oneshare/one-vote approach to corporate voting.").
10 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 67-70.
11 For a discussion of the history of the shareholder primacy norm, see Jill E. Fisch,
MeasuringEfficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637,
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one way of ensuring that the corporation pursues these ends. Moreover,
the "one share, one vote" standard is the best way of ensuring that these
ends are pursued. Each shareholder should have one vote for each share
so that all shareholders have voting power equivalent to their interest in
the residual. This provides all shareholders with the proper incentives
to oversee management, choose to accept or reject a proposed merger,
and otherwise maximize the wealth generated by the corporation.
Otherwise, shareholders would have disproportionate interests in the
residual, resulting in disproportionate voting interests.
Critical to the success of this theory, however, is the notion that all
shareholders have the same interest-namely, maximizing the residual
value of the corporation. Shareholder primacy theory maintains that all
shareholders have homogeneity of interest. Indeed, it is seen as a
necessary aspect of the theory. If the purpose of the corporation is to
maximize the residual, then the shareholders must all agree with this
purpose. Otherwise, shareholders may elect directors who will pursue
interests apart from residual wealth maximization. Thus, corporate law
theorists have repeatedly emphasized the homogeneity of shareholder
12
interests as a critical assumption of the model.
Recent developments in the field of finance, however, have called
shareholder homogeneity into question. For example, new derivative
financial products allow stockholders to hedge their financial interest
such that they no longer have the same interests as their shareholding
counterparts. 3 As a result, hedged shareholders might vote against the
interests of the corporation in order to maximize the value of their
derivative stake.
Conversely, shareholders may retain "hidden"
ownership of their shares, such that immense voting power in the
corporation can be pulled out from seemingly thin air when this voting
power would be instrumental. 1 4 Such shareholders have greater voting
power than their reported stock ownership would indicate; indeed, their
voting power may be much greater than their interest in residual profits.
Based on these conflicts between shareholder interests, some scholars
have argued that the theory behind "one share, one vote" is no longer
valid and have pushed to exclude certain shareholders from the
5
franchise.1
646-50 (2006).
12 See generally Paul H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, Corporate Voting and the Takeover
Debate, 58 VAND. L. REV. 453, 464 (2005) (discussing the assumption of homogeneity in other
corporate law models).
13 See Martin & Partnoy, supra note 9, at 778 (describing how equity derivatives may allow a
shareholder to reallocate their interest in the residual); Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New
Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 815
(2006) (noting that "[i]n an extreme case, an investor can vote despite having negative economic
ownership.").
14 See Hu & Black, supra note 13, at 836-42.
15 Martin & Partnoy, supra note 9, at 778, 793.
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However, while this particular type of competing interest is new,
competing interests among shareholders are not. Shareholders are not
the homogenous share-value maximizers that the "one share, one vote"
theory envisions. Instead, shareholders are likely to have a variety of
interests that can potentially compete with their interests as
shareholders. In addition, even shareholders who have no other
financial interests may still have different views on how best to
maximize shareholder wealth or their individual shareholder utility.
Instead of being a limited exception, the recent growth of hedged
shareholders is merely another example of how shareholders fail to
comport with the homogenized vision of corporate law.
Moreover, even if shareholders were homogenous, their singleminded focus on profits would not justify giving them sole control over
the corporation. Easterbrook and Fischel, in their classic article (and
later, book) on shareholder voting, justified the shareholder franchise as
the best way to aggregate preferences along a certain axis without
descending into constant struggles over power.' 6 However, their
analysis misreads the literature on social choice and preference
aggregation. The need for agreement along a single spectrum fails to
justify the elevation of shareholder preferences above all others. When
we remove the assumption of shareholder homogeneity and consider the
actual conflicted nature of their preferences, we can no longer justify
shareholder democracy based on the traditional rationales.
This paper argues for a reconsideration of the traditional
justifications for the "one share, one vote" standard, as well as the
limitations of the corporate polity to shareholders. In Part I, we draw on
the voting rights literature more generally in discussing the
considerations that go into creating a system of political voting rights.
In Part II, we discuss the shareholder franchise within the corporation,
its foundational justifications, and some problems with the traditional
notion of the homogenous shareholder. In Part III, we first discuss why
shareholder heterogeneity causes problems for the traditional efficiency
rationale for the shareholder franchise. We then discuss how, regardless
of heterogeneity, preference aggregation theory does not require that
only shareholders have voting rights within the corporation. Finally, in
Part IV, we begin the discussion of how preference theory and utility
maximization might be used to reconfigure the organizational structure
of the corporation.

16 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in CorporateLaw, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395
(1983); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5.
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VOTING IN THE POLITICAL ARENA

The Basic Structure of Voting Rights Law

Life is full of decisions. Some are fairly simple, like what one
should order for dinner. A preference for one dish over the others
would drive an individual decision. Decisions made by groups of
people, however, are more complicated. When forced to order a dish
for a group, we need some way of moving from individual desires to a
group decision.1 7 We need, in other words, a social choice function.1 8
There are many kinds of social choice functions to choose from-we
could just order what one person wants (the dinner dictator), we could
flip a coin, or we could use an approach that seems to better capture the
preferences of the members of the group, such as voting. Most
democratic institutions have taken this third approach when it comes to
translating individual preferences into group choices. 9 Indeed, voting
is the sine qua non of democratic decision-making.
When political institutions settle on voting as the preferred method
of preference aggregation, they still have many decisions to make about
how to structure the process. Those decisions often come to be
embodied in a set of legal entitlements, or voting rights, which
collectively sketch the contours of polity. These voting rights, though,
are not uni-dimensional; instead, there are at least three distinct facets to
the rights to vote, each of which is necessary to ensuring full democratic
20
participation.

17 The study of how we make such moves comes under the heading of social choice theory,
which has entered the legal literature under the guise of public choice theory. See, e.g.,
MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW (1997); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP
P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991).

18 The terminology here follows WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A
CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE

(1982). A social choice function is a rule that translates a preference profile (a set of individual
preference orders, one for each member of society) into a social preference order (a complete
arrangement of alternatives in order of their attractiveness to society as a whole). Id. at 18, 29697.
19 See NORMAN FROHLICH & JOE A. OPPENHEIMER, MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY

16

(1978).
20 This taxonomy is, in part, borrowed from Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The
Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
173, 176 (1989). See also Grant M. Hayden, Resolving the Dilemma of Minority Representation,
92 CAL. L. REV. 1589, 1594-1602 (2004) [hereinafter Hayden, Resolving the Dilemma] (giving a
brief account of the history of each aspect of the right). Other ways of parsing out the right to
vote, see, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, What Kind of Right is "The Right to Vote "?, 93 VA. L. REV. IN
BRIEF 45 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/04/23/pildes.pdf, and Pamela S.
Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1709-20
(1993), are not inconsistent with this conception.
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The first aspect of the right to vote involves access-the ability to
cast a ballot. 2 1 This constitutes voting rights at their most fundamental,
and is what people are usually talking about when discussing the right
to vote. But the mere ability to cast a ballot is not sufficient to ensure
meaningful participation. One's vote must be accorded sufficient
weight and must be combined with those of other like-minded voters to
give the voter an opportunity to influence the outcome of an election.
Hence the development of the second and third aspects of the right to
vote. The second aspect is the right to cast a vote that carries an
appropriate numerical weight, one that is quantitatively undiluted. 22 For
most elections in the United States, this means that the election districts
must be drawn in ways consistent with the principle of one person, one
vote. Even with equal access and equal weighting, however, voters may
be denied meaningful participation through a variety of other political
practices such as gerrymandering and at-large districting. 23 Such
practices, which may qualitatively dilute a group's voting power, gave
rise to the third aspect of the right to vote, and are at the heart of much
of the nation's voting rights litigation today. A robust understanding of
the right to vote, then, involves several distinct (yet related)
components. Full democratic participation depends upon enforcement
of all three aspects of the right.

21 For a relatively recent history of the right to vote, see ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT
For
information about voting in the early years of the republic, see MARCHETTE CHUTE, THE FIRST

TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (2000).

LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE IN AMERICA, 1619-1850 (1969); CHILTON
WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE: FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY, 1760-1860 (1960). For

information about voting rights in more recent years, with an emphasis on the quest for minority
representation, see QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT, 1965-1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994); BERNARD GROFMAN,
LISA HANDLEY & RICHARD G. NIEMI, MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR
VOTING EQUALITY (1992); STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE
SOUTH, 1944-1969 (1976); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS:
SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910
(1974).

22 For background on this aspect of the right to vote, see ROBERT G. DIXON, JR.,
DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS (1968);
REPRESENTATION AND MISREPRESENTATION: LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE (Robert A. Goldwin ed., 1966); GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT
REVOLUTION: REPRESENTATION, POLITICAL POWER, AND THE SUPREME COURT (1966); ROBERT
B. MCKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION (1965);

Hayden, Resolving the Dilemma, supra note 20; Grant M. Hayden, The False Promise of One
Person, One Vote, 102 MICH. L. REV. 213 (2003) [hereinafter Hayden, False Promise].
23 See Hayden, Resolving the Dilemma, supra note 20, at 1600-02 (detailing minority vote
dilution); Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymanderingand Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593
(2002) (discussing political gerrymandering).
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Theoretical Underpinningsof the Right to Vote

The political history of the United States is in large part a chronicle
of the battles fought over who, exactly, should receive voting rights.
Should blacks be allowed to cast ballots? Women? Resident aliens?
Should urban and rural votes be assigned the same amount of numerical
What about full-time residents and part-time residents?
weight?
Should Hispanics that make up a sufficient proportion of the population
be guaranteed a certain number of representatives of their choice? What
about Republicans? The answers to these questions have been highly
contested, and many admit of no simple answers.
Even though there has been little agreement over the proper scope
of a particular aspect of voting rights, there has been some common
ground. There has been a consistent appeal to certain principles by both
sides of most of these debates. Sometimes, those principles are too
vague to provide much of a ground for debate-references to
"fundamental" notions of equality come to mind. But in other cases,
these basic principles are a little less slippery, and provide a better
platform for discussion. In this subsection, we will examine one of
these basic principles: the relationship between voting rights and one's
interest, or stake, in the outcome of an election. We will then discuss
the basic aspects of the various proxies that political democracies rely
upon to assess that interest for the purpose of conferring voting rights.
1.

Voting Rights and Interest
a.

Interest and Access

Debates regarding the most basic issue in voting rights-who
should be allowed to vote-are informed by many things. But chief
among these is an assessment about the degree to which a potential
voter is affected by the outcome of the election. 24 Those with a strong
interest in the outcome, with a sufficient stake, are prime candidates for
the franchise. Those with little or nothing riding on the outcome, on the
24 See Hayden, False Promise, supra note 22, at 251-61 (discussing the relationship between
preference strength and various manifestations of the right to vote); Melvyn R. Durchslag, Salyer,
Ball, and Holt: Reappraisingthe Right to Vote in Terms of Political "'Interest"and Vote Dilution,
33 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1, 38-39 (1982) (discussing the fact that "'interest,' implicitly or
explicitly, must be the touchstone of the [Supreme] Court's analysis" of several types of voting
rights cases). We do not claim that this reason motivates all decisions to enfranchise or
disenfranchise people. There are obviously people with strong interests in the outcomes of
elections (e.g., people with mental disabilities, children) who are nonetheless prohibited from
voting for other reasons, mostly having to do with their competency.
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other hand, are rarely extended voting rights. Figuring out which people
have a sufficient stake in the outcome of an election, and hence a right
to vote, is contentious. But there is often an underlying point of
agreement-that we can make that decision based, in large part, on the
relative strength of one's interest in the election.
This should not come as a great surprise. Voting, after all, is a
social choice mechanism, a way of moving from individual preferences
over an array of alternatives (candidates, propositions, dinner options)
to group choices. And this is done in a way intended to maximize
preference satisfaction.2 5 People with a strong interest in the outcome
of a vote, with correspondingly strong preferences, are obviously the
first candidates for the right to vote in such an election. People with
weak or nonexistent preferences with respect to the outcome of a vote
do not have much to contribute to this end-their lives, their interests,
and their happiness are not much affected by the outcome.
There are additional, related reasons for tying the franchise to
preference strength. For example, because those with a strong stake in
the outcome have to live with the consequences, they may be more
likely to make better decisions. They may, for example, think more
deeply about their vote, and may be more likely to educate themselves
on the specific candidate or issues at stake. And the outcome of the
election may be perceived as more legitimate when those who are
greatly affected had the opportunity to vote. The rallying cry "No
taxation without representation" trades on this sentiment.
There is, unfortunately, no way to directly test the strength of
people's preferences in order to see who should vote. We could, for
example, just ask people how strong their interests are, but there would
First, while many
be numerous problems with that approach.
individuals may accurately report that they feel more or less strongly
about the outcome of any election, there is no way for them (or anyone
26
else) to neutrally compare such reports with those of other individuals.
There is no universal scale upon which to measure everyone's
preference strength and, even if there were, there is no omniscient social
scientist to peer directly into everyone's minds and make a proper
Second, making those kinds of person-by-person
assessment. 27
assessments by polling or interviewing people would be prohibitively
25 Hayden, False Promise,supra note 22, at 248-49.
26 This is generally discussed as the difficulty in making interpersonal comparisons of utility.
For a summary of the problem, see id. at 236-47. See also INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF
WELL-BEING (Jon Lister & John E. Roemer eds., 1991); JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS
MEANING,

MEASUREMENT,

AND

MORAL IMPORTANCE

113-20 (1986);

Peter

Hammond,

Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Why and How They Are and Should Be Made, in
INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING 200, 238-254 (Jon Elster & John E. Roemer
eds., 1991).
27 See Hayden, False Promise,supra note 22, at 245.
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expensive, especially when you consider the fact that all representative
governments would need to assess all potential voters. 28 And, finally,
we would be worried about strategic misrepresentation of the strength
of one's preferences, especially since something useful-voting
rights-would come with the expression of a strong interest in the
outcome of an election. 29 Relying on first-person reports, then, would
not work, and has not been the way governmental entities have made
such assessments. 30 They have instead relied on various proxies for
one's level of interest in the outcome of an election.
There are both historical and contemporary examples involving
debates over the extent of the franchise that make this point clear. At
the turn of the nineteenth century, many states limited voting to white
men who owned a certain amount of real property. These freehold
requirements were supported by the idea that those who possessed such
property "had a unique 'stake in society'-meaning that they were
committed members of (or shareholders in) the community and that
they had a personal interest in the policies of the state, especially
taxation."'3 1
The taxpaying requirements that replaced freehold
requirements in the early nineteenth century were justified on similar
grounds-that only those who shoulder the burdens of government
should have a voice in it (turning the traditional rallying cry on its head:
"No representation without taxation"). 32 In both instances, economic
participation is seen as a proxy for an interest in the outcome of an
election, and thus a proper prerequisite to the right to vote.
Modem restrictions on the franchise are often justified on the same
grounds.
Take, for example, residency requirements.
These
requirements are ubiquitous and constitute such an entrenched part of
the democratic landscape that they are rarely analyzed as mechanisms
that disenfranchise enormous numbers of people. They go largely
unquestioned because we think that residency usually serves as an
accurate proxy for one's interest in the outcome of an election. The
scope of most government entities' powers is geographically
circumscribed, and the belief is that only those living within the
territory under control of the entity have enough at stake to vote. 33 In
those rare situations when academics or courts challenge residency
requirements, they challenge this link between residency and interest,
28 You could not rely on some other proxy for strength of voter interest, such as residency, for
that would beg the question.
29 See Hayden, False Promise, supra note 22, at 240.
30 Except to the extent that voting is not compulsory in the United States. Qualified voters

could always just signal their lack of interest by staying home on the election day. See id. at 25859.
31 KEYSSAR, supra note 21, at 5.
32 Seeid. at 50, 131.
33 See Hayden, False Promise,supra note 22, at 256-57.
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arguing that residency, or the lack of it, is not an accurate proxy for the
strength of one's interest in the outcome of the elections. 34 Instead,
there are certain classes of nonresidents-such as people who work in
the jurisdiction, people who own property in the jurisdiction, or people
otherwise affected by the entity's actions-that may be sufficiently
affected by the decisions of the governmental entity to be entitled to
vote. 35 But the underlying assumption-that only people with a certain
degree of interest in the outcome of an election should be allowed to
vote-is shared by all.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed the relationship
between the right to vote and the degree of interest in an election. They
were most explicit about it in Kramer v. Union Free School District, a
case involving a challenge to a New York statute that limited voting in
school board elections to people who either (1) owned or leased taxable
real property in the district, or (2) had children enrolled in the district's
schools. 36 The statute was challenged by a childless man who lived
with his parents in the district. 37 The Court struck down the restrictions
on the franchise as both over- and under-inclusive:
[A]ppellant resides with his parents in the school district, pays state
and federal taxes and is interested in and affected by school board
decisions; however, he has no vote. On the other hand, an
uninterested unemployed young man who pays no state or federal
taxes, but who rents an apartment in the district, can participate in the
38
election.
The restrictions were problematic to the extent that they did not
correspond well enough to one's interest in the outcome of the election.
The underlying assumption was made explicit by the Court when it
explained that a state could indeed limit the franchise to a portion of the
electorate that was "primarily affected" by the outcome: it just needed
to demonstrate that "all those excluded are in fact substantially less
interested or affected than those the [franchise] includes. '39 But the
34 See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 69 (1978) (explaining that "[t]he
imaginary line defining a city's corporate limits cannot corral the influence of municipal actions.
A city's decisions inescapably affect individuals living immediately outside its borders.");
Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in MetropolitanAreas, 48 STAN. L.

REv. 1115, 1132 (1996) ("Boundaries exclude people who may be interested in or affected by the
decisions made within the boundaries.").

35 See Hayden, False Promise, supra note 22, at 257. For this reason and others, some
scholars have suggested decoupling voting from residency. See Richard Thompson Ford, Beyond
Borders: A Partial Response to Richard Briffault, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1173, 1187-89 (1996);
Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1909 (1994); Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization,60 U. CHI. L. REV.
253, 324-25 (1993). For a critique, see Briffault, supra note 34 at 1158-62.
36 395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969).
37 Id. at 624.

38 Id. at 632 n.15.
39 Id. at 632.
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state's goal-to connect the right to vote with the strength of one's
interest in the election-was proper.
With respect to access, then, it is fairly clear, as a descriptive
matter at least, that the right to cast a ballot is closely tied to the strength
of one's interest in the outcome of the election. Because there is no way
to directly assess the level of one's interest, however, we are forced to
rely upon various proxies-property holding, residency, citizenship,
etc.-to determine it. Debates over the scope of the franchise are
largely debates over how well particular proxies match up with voter
interest. The underlying agreement, though, is that the proxies should
reflect the degree of such interest.
b.

Interest and Weighting Votes

There may be a similar sort of agreement with respect to assigning
numerical weights to votes. 40 After all, the strength of people's
preferences varies widely. At some point, we may decide that their
interests are strong enough that they should have the right to vote. But
that simple, binary approach to voting rights (either you have the vote or
you don't) doesn't fully capture the range of people's interests. Perhaps
the weight of each person's vote should be calibrated to the strength of
their interest in the outcome. Everyone's vote could be assigned a
relative weight that reflects the strength of their preferences-thus
41
providing some optimal level of participation.
If such a value underlay the law of vote weighting, this would
mean that, after a decision is made to grant the right to cast a ballot,
there would be an additional decision with respect to how much weight
to assign to each vote. We should expect to see a wide range of
numerical weights assigned to people's votes, one that reflected the
varying degrees to which they cared about the outcome of the election.
Is this something we see when we look at the structure of the second
aspect of the right to vote?
At first glance, the answer appears to be no. The one person, one
vote standard, which assigns everyone's vote about the same weight,
dominates the political landscape. This could mean several things (in
addition to the fact that we're just wrong and something else drives
these decisions). It may reflect a positive judgment that everyone has,
more or less, about the same level of interest in the outcome of most

40 One would expect these two aspects of voting rights to be closely related since numerically
diluting a vote may have the same effect as prohibiting voting. See Hayden, False Promise,
supra note 22, at 255.
41 See id. at 248.
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political elections. 42 But that just doesn't make sense: we know that
people have a wide range of levels of interest, at least wider than is
captured by a simple decision whether or not to allow them to place an
equally-weighted vote. Another possibility is that there may be
something else at work here, something that limits our ability to develop
a more nuanced vote-weighting system. And given what was discussed
above about the difficulties in making interpersonal utility comparisons,
this appears to make more sense.
As opposed to a positive judgment about the equal-strength of
voter preferences, the Supreme Court's one person, one vote standard
may actually involve a negative judgment that we will rarely have the
type of information about preference strength to assign more nuanced
weight to votes. 43 It is our inability to objectively compare relative
preference strength that drives our reliance on the one person, one vote
standard. Of course, a requirement that political institutions assign
equal weight to votes, just like a requirement about assigning differing
weights to votes, is itself a judgment about the relative strength of
preferences that cannot be grounded on neutral principles. 44 But this
may just mean that the Supreme Court was fooling itself when it
thought it was developing a neutral, judicially manageable standard for
quantitative vote dilution (something that the dissenters to the original
45
malapportionment cases rightly argued at the time).
This view is also confirmed, oddly enough, by an exception to the
As outlined above, the
one person, one vote requirement.
equiproportional standard applies to Congressional and state legislative
districts. And it applies to local governmental units that exercise
general governmental powers-those that might be expected to affect
everyone within the jurisdiction in a similar manner, or to a similar
degree. 46 But what about local units that disproportionately affect
identifiable groups? The Supreme Court first raised that question in
Avery v. Midland County, where it noted:
Were the Commissioners Court a special-purpose unit of government
assigned the performance of functions affecting definable groups of
constituents more than other constituents, we would have to confront
the question whether such a body may be apportioned in ways which
give greater influence to the citizens most affected by the

42 See id. at 251.

43 Seeid. at 251-52.
44 See id. at 249-50.
45 See id. at 250-51; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(arguing that an equiproportional standard is just one among many "competing bases of
representation.").
46 See Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 694-96 (1989); Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist.,
397 U.S. 50, 54 (1970); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1968); Hayden, False
Promise,supra note 22, at 252-53.
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organization's functions. 47
The Supreme Court was forced to confront this issue of special
purpose districts just a few years later in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake
48
Basin Water Storage District.
Salyer involved a sparsely populated water district that covered
close to 200,000 acres of farmland. 49 The district, governed by an
elected board of directors, was in charge of the acquisition, storage, and
distribution of water.50 Participation in the board elections, however,
was limited to landowners, and their votes were apportioned based on
the assessed valuation of the land they owned (a one acre, one vote
system). 5' This was challenged as a violation of the one person, one
vote requirement, but the Supreme Court rejected the challenge and, in
so doing, created the special purpose district exception to the
requirement.5 2 The Court found that, in cases like this, such a system
made sense because the board's powers disproportionately affected
landowners (as opposed to mere residents), and affected them in
53
proportion to the amount of land they owned.
This exception to the one person, one vote standard may not prove
the rule, but it does give us some insight into its foundation. The one
person, one vote rule is the default, in large part, because we think that
voter interest in entities exercising general governmental powers is
more or less equivalent. When we think we have reliable information to
the contrary-when, for example, we think we have a good proxy for
judging the strength of people's preferences regarding the outcome of
the election-we allow movement away from the default to a more
finely calibrated system of voting weights. So we do, in fact, see a
calibrated response to perceived voter strength in our basic political
institutions. We just don't see it that frequently in the political arena
because we rarely have proxies that we believe are reliable enough to
make more subtle distinctions.
c.

Interest and Combining Votes

Once we ensure that those with sufficiently strong preferences with
respect to the outcome of an election have the vote, and we have
calibrated those votes, if possible, to the degree of preference strength,
there remains work to be done. It turns out that there are many ways to
47 Avery, 390 U.S. at 483-84.
48 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
49 Id. at 723.

50 Id.
51 See id. at 724-25.
52 See id. at 730.
53 See id. at 729, 734.
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prevent groups of voters from successfully aggregating their
preferences. The third facet of voting rights-the right to a qualitatively
undiluted vote-is designed to prevent this from happening. So does
the concern with preference strength inform this third facet of voting
rights as well?
There are two reasons to think that it does. First, to the extent that
the third aspect of voting rights helps prevent the reasons driving the
first two aspects from being thwarted, the third aspect, at a minimum, is
preservative of the preference aggregating functions of the first two.
For example, we are worried about placing a large minority of voters
with similar views into an at-large districting structure that would result
in the election of none of their preferred candidates. The at-large voting
structure tends to increase the likelihood that large numbers of strongly
held preferences will be completely neglected in the outcome. And
we're worried about it for that reason, so we make sure that
qualitatively dilutive devices aren't used to thwart or distort preference
aggregation. Thus, this third aspect of voting rights is not inconsistent
with, and serves the end of, tailoring voting strength to preference
strength.
Second, the benchmark for claims of qualitative vote dilution
seems to involve some assessment of proportionality. Every election
has its winners and losers-that's how democracy works. The difficulty
in assessing claims of qualitative vote dilution is separating out victims
from mere losers. How do we tell for the purposes of section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, for example, when a minority group has had less
opportunity to participate and elect representatives of its choice? What
is the standard for assessing dilution? While there is no simple answer
to the question, almost all solutions depend, in part, on an assessment of
Proportionality is not strictly applied in most
proportionality.5 4
instances, and there is even an express prohibition against a guarantee
of proportionality in section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 55 Yet it is
difficult to conceive of a qualitative vote dilution standard completely
detached from it.
The structure of voting rights in the political arena, then, involves a
series of decisions about how to best aggregate individual preferences
into group choices. Generally, we allow those with sufficiently strong
interests with respect to the outcome to vote. In cases where we have
more nuanced information about the strength of that interest, we allow
entities to calibrate the numerical weight assigned to those votes. And
in aggregating votes, we worry about various devices that may thwart
54 See Sanford Levinson, Gerrymanderingand the Brooding Omnipresence of Proportional
Representation: Why Won't It Go Away?, 33 UCLA. L. REv. 257 (1985).
55 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006) ("[N]othing in this section establishes a right to have
members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.").
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the collective expression of these preferences. Many of a polity's
decisions with respect to voting rights, then, depend upon finding
successful proxies for the strength of voter interest in the outcome of an
election.
2.

Proxies for Voter Interest

The relationship between voting rights and preference strength
should, on reflection, be fairly obvious-after all, voting is merely a
method used to aggregate individual preferences. Thus, decisions about
who has the right to vote and how much weight to assign to that vote are
driven in large part by assessments of voter interest in the outcome of
the election. Assessing individual voter interest, though, is easier said
than done. There is no way to directly observe or compare levels of
voter interest, and merely asking people how much they care about an
election is unworkable.
For that reason, those who structure and administer democratic
institutions rely on various proxies for the strength of voter interest. For
political entities with general governmental powers, we have tinkered
with various proxies in the past--e.g., owning property, paying taxesand have now settled on a variety of proxies such as residency and
citizenship that better capture the group of voters who are sufficiently
interested in the outcome of elections. (For corporations, we have
settled on stock ownership, and in many cases have further calibrated
the basic voting rules with the one share, one vote system). The success
of the voting structures of both types of institutions depends, in large
part, on how well these proxies work.
In order to assess how well a proxy works, we generally look to
two features: whether it accurately reflects the degree of interest and
whether it is manageable. The accuracy of a proxy for voter eligibility
depends on how well it describes the group of people who have
sufficient interests in the outcome of the election. There are two basic
ways that such a proxy may be off the mark-it may be under-inclusive
or over-inclusive. A proxy is under-inclusive if it fails to identify
people with an interest in the election, and thus disenfranchises them (of
course, a democratic entity could stitch together several under-inclusive
proxies in order to more fully capture the entire group of interested
voters). A proxy is over-inclusive if it includes people without an
interest in the election, and thus dilutes the voting strength of those with
a real interest. When it comes to assigning weight to votes, the accuracy
of the proxy depends upon how well it is calibrated to the strength of
voter preferences.
Take, for example, some of the proxies that have been used in the
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United States for voter interest.
The early property-holding
requirements were fine as far as they went, but they were underinclusive, disenfranchising vast numbers of property-less residents who
had vital interests in the exercise of governmental powers. Residency
requirements, on the other hand, seem to better capture the group of
interested people, since most people within the geographic jurisdiction
of a governmental entity-and thus subject to its police powers, taxing
powers, etc.-have quite a bit at stake in the outcome of an election.
Residency, of course, may be under-inclusive in that it fails to capture
nonresidents who work, own property, or have other interests in the
jurisdiction (or over-inclusive since it may enfranchise people who are
moving out of the jurisdiction the day after the election and thus have
little at stake), but not nearly so much as property-holding requirements.
And, as discussed above, states are often prohibited from using a proxy
that is too under-inclusive, too over-inclusive, or both. New York's
attempt to use having children in the school system or owning or renting
taxable real estate as a proxy for interest in the outcome of school
district elections, for example, was struck down as both under-inclusive
and over-inclusive.
Of course, democratic institutions, both governmental and
corporate, could develop more carefully tailored proxies. While there
isn't (yet) a machine to peer into people's heads to assess and compare
their preference strengths, one could imagine that extensive
questionnaires could better determine one's interest in the outcome of
any possible election. The answers on those questionnaires could then
be frequently updated and double-checked for accuracy. In the end, we
would probably have a better sense of who should be voting in a
particular election than we do now. The problem, of course, is that such
a system would be unmanageable. For starters, it would be quite costly
as well as fairly easy to manipulate. Which brings us to the second
characteristic of a useful proxy-its manageability.
The manageability of a proxy may mean several things, 56 but, for
our purposes, we merely mean whether it is realistically workable.
There are many reasons why proxies might be unmanageable. They
may be physically impossible (using brain scans to compare preference
strengths). They may be too costly (using extensive, constantly updated
surveys). Or they may be too readily manipulated (relying on a
potential voters' professed interest in an election). In other words,
something-be it cost, fraud, or some other factor-may prevent the
proxy from accurately reflecting the preference strength of people it is
designed to test.
56 In voting rights, the manageability of a particular voting rights requirement might mean,
for example, that courts will be able to administer the standard in a neutral manner, without
injecting their own biases into the case.
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Democratic institutions, for good reason, value proxies that are
easily managed.
In the political arena, freehold and taxpaying
requirements were easily administered. There were already lists of
people who owned property and paid taxes, usually within possession of
the governmental entity holding the election. It would have been
difficult for any individual to fraudulently add his name to the list;
difficult enough, anyway, that it wouldn't be worth the vote that came
with it. This does not mean, of course, that such requirements, standing
alone, accurately picked out the group of people who were interested in
the result of a particular political election. But they were quite easily
administered. In the corporate arena, stock ownership is also something
that is easily confirmed, which makes it a readily manageable standard
for voting rights.
It is more difficult to come by a manageable standard for the more
carefully calibrated proxies necessary to assign different weights to
votes. Democratic institutions usually look to something that is both
readily confirmed and, not to put too fine a point on it, countable.
Whether it is the number of acres owned for the purposes of a water
district election or the number of shares owned for the purposes of a
corporate election, the presence of readily ascertained and countable
acres or shares allows the institution to administer the voting system.
The difficulty in finding manageable proxies for more subtle
assessments of preference strength may explain why equal weighting is
often the default rule in democratic elections. 57 The one person, one
vote standard, for example, is nothing if not easily manageable: one just
needs to be able to count and divide. 58 Like some of the easily
administered proxies for basic interest in an election, however, there
may be reasons why the equal weighting of votes does not come close
to accurately capturing preference strength. As John Hart Ely noted, the
one person, one vote standard "is certainly administratable ... the more
''59
troublesome question is what else it has to recommend it.

There is a great deal of underlying agreement, then, that the right
to vote, and the weight assigned to that vote, should correspond to the
level of a voter's interest in the outcome of an election. Perfect
correspondence between voting rights and interest, though, is
unattainable, because we do not have precise methods for assessing the
57 See Hayden, False Promise,supra note 22.
58 Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 510 (1968) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (maintaining
that apportionment is "far too subtle and complicated a business to be resolved as a matter of
constitutional law in terms of sixth-grade arithmetic.").
59 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 121 (1980).
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strength of voter preferences with respect to any particular election. We
must therefore rely upon various proxies that imperfectly capture the
degree of voter interest, and strike a balance between the accuracy and
manageability of a proxy. In this way, a democratic polity is designed
to best reflect the interests of those affected by the exercise of its
powers.

II.

VOTING IN THE CORPORATE ARENA

The elections of democratic polities are designed to aggregate the
preferences of those with some interest or stake in the polity. Corporate
elections are no different. And just as "one person, one vote" has
become the mantra of preference aggregation in our democratic polity,
so "one share, one vote" has become the rallying cry in corporate law.
Both standards share some of the same strengths, from a preferenceaggregation perspective. One share, one vote has a seemingly perfect
correspondence between one's interest in the company and the voting
power assigned to that interest. In addition, the standard appears to be
easily manageable, and it has the ring of fairness-votes to each
according to their share.
One share, one vote, however, is not the "timeless and natural"
voting structure that it appears. 60 It is neither a requirement here in the
United States nor in Europe, 6 1 and in fact the percentage of companies
with alternative voting structures is increasing. 62 Moreover, shareholder
voting has gone through a number of historical trends, reflecting the
economical and political concerns of different eras. Indeed, other forms
of business organizations aggregate the preferences of their members in
a quite different fashion.
More to the point, while much has been written on the proper
weighting of corporate votes, less attention is paid to the antecedent
(and more fundamental) issue of who receives the right to vote to begin
with. The literature often assumes that the franchise is to be restricted
to shareholders alone and then discusses how to best parse out voting
power among them. This initial restriction, though, disenfranchises
large numbers of people-such as employees, customers, and
suppliers-with significant interests in the corporate polity.

60 Dunlavy, supra note 7, at 1356 (discussing this perception).
61 Id. at 1349.
62 Marco Becht & J. Bradford DeLong, Why Has There Been So Little Block Holding in
America?, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD: FAMILY
BUSINESS GROUPS TO PROFESSIONAL MANAGERS 613, 653-57 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2005)
(noting that the number of dual or multi-class share corporations listed on the New York Stock
Exchange more than doubled from 1994 to 2001).
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Given that most voting systems are intended, at a minimum, to
aggregate the preferences of those with an interest in the enterprise, it is
curious that many groups with significant interests in the corporate
polity are completely disenfranchised. Perhaps this is so because it is
difficult to design good proxies for their interests-perhaps there is no
accurate and manageable way to pick out those (other than
shareholders) with significant interests in a corporation. Perhaps the
interests of non-shareholders are best represented by legal relationships
other than voting, such as by contract (though it seems that, at their best,
such contracts would incompletely capture their interest in the future of
the corporation). In any case, this curious question-why voting rights
are restricted to one group of interested stakeholders and, further, parsed
out according to the one share, one vote formula-requires further
inquiry. And that inquiry must begin with a review of the basic nature
of the corporate polity itself.
A.

Governance in Business Organizations

When we think of a corporation, we generally think of the
collection of people and assets that make up its everyday business. But
in a legal sense, a corporation is a fiction-it is a legal entity created by
a government document that has no "independent" existence. Thus, it is
perhaps more helpful to conceive of the corporation as a legal structure
designed to allocate rights and duties among the collection of people
and assets that give the corporation life. The corporation is generally
formed for a business purpose. In the nineteenth century, corporations
had a specific corporate purpose within their corporate charter. 63 Even
though no specific purpose is legally required today, most corporations
are formed by a certain collection of people with a certain collection of
assets who believe that forming the corporation will better help them
achieve a set of business-oriented goals. They could do this without
forming a corporation, but forming a corporation under state law in
some ways helps them to effectuate their goals. The corporation is
designed to facilitate collective economic activity.
The corporation is not the only form of business organization
operating in the U.S. economy: along with corporations, there are sole
proprietorships, partnerships, business trusts, limited partnerships,
limited liability partnerships, and limited liability companies. 64 The
complexity of these forms is usually seen as existing along a spectrum,
with the sole proprietorship being the most basic and the corporation
63 NORMAN I. SILBER, A CORPORATE FORM OF FREEDOM (2001).

64 JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 2 (2d ed. 2003) (including the

joint stock company and the partnership association in some states).
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being the most advanced. 65 What separates the corporation from other
forms of business organization? Scholars have isolated five factors
which are considered essential to the corporate form: (1) full legal
personality, including the ability to bind the firm to contracts; (2)
limited liability for owners and managers; (3) shared ownership by
investors of capital; (4) delegated management under a board structure;
66
and (5) transferable shares.
In terms of governance, the two essential corporate features are (3)
shared ownership by investors and (4) delegated management. This
structure is manifest in a tripartite set of players: the shareholders, the
board of directors, and the officers. The shareholders are sometimes
designated as the "owners" of the firm: they have the right to receive
residual profits as well as the right to elect the board of directors. 67 The
directors are, in turn, the locus of authority within the corporation; they
are the representatives of the firm when human counterparts to the
fictional form are required. 68 The board does not generally run the
business, however-directors generally delegate this power to the
officers of the corporation. These officers in turn select the remaining
employees. The structure is hierarchical, in that shareholders can vote
out directors, directors can fire the officers, and the officers can fire the
69
remaining employees.
Other business organizations generally have more flexible
governance requirements. In partnership law, the default rule is that
each partner has an equal share of the voting power, unless decided
otherwise by the partners. 70 Certainly, partners are free to set up
alternative voting structures, and most sophisticated partnerships have
complicated methods of aggregating the preferences of their members.
But the default rule has continuing relevance because partnerships may
be created without an explicit agreement between the parties. 7 1 When
65 Within the corporation category, closely-held corporations are sometimes separated from
publicly-held corporations, although they are formed through the same state incorporation
statutes. Closely-held corporations are identified as those with: (1) a small number of
stockholders; (2) no ready market for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority stockholder
participation in management. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328
N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 1975).
66 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO.
L.J. 439, 439-40 (2001); cf CLARK, supra note 8, at 2 (listing four characteristics of the
corporation: (1)limited liability, (2) free transferability of investor interests, (3) legal personality,
and (4) centralized management).
67 This designation is something of a misnomer. See infra note 117.
68 CLARK, supra note 8, at 21.
69 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 547, 555-58 [hereinafter Bainbridge, Means and Ends]
(discussing the hierarchical nature of corporate structure).
70 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 18(e), 6 U.L.A. 526 (1995); REV. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 401(f) (amended

1997).
71 A partnership has been defined as "an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-
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the parties have not explicitly agreed to form a partnership, they will not
have established a governance framework and thus will be given the
default setting. Even in situations where one partner has provided
substantially more money or labor to the partnership than other partners,
72
all will have an equal vote in partnership decisions.
The "one partner, one vote" default rule can be wildly inequitable,
at least if voting power is meant to correspond with one's actual
contributions to the enterprise. As an alternative, a court could conduct
a simple calculation of the dollars invested by each partner, and votes
would be allocated according to the funds invested. Why has the law
instead assented to such a blunt division of power? Perhaps most
importantly, the default division of profits and losses (the interest in the
residual) is to provide each partner with an equal share. 73 As in the
"one share, one vote" system, the (default) voting power is equal to the
(default) share of profits and losses. In addition, a partner-oriented
default rule is much easier to manage than an investment-oriented rule.
A "one partner, one vote" default allocation may provide the best mix of
interest aggregation and manageability in sorting out voting power
74
amongst partners.
Of course, "one partner, one vote" is only the default rule. Partners
who contemplate varying levels of input and interest will generally
construct a partnership agreement that allocates votes according to
mutual agreement. 75 And there is no requirement that each partner must
have an equal vote according to that partner's 'share' in the residual
profits. Instead, partners are free to divvy up voting power according to
contributions, seniority, experience, involvement, and other factors
relevant to governance. 76 There is no scholarly literature saying that
partnerships are poorly constructed if they fail to match voting rights to
the residual.
The business trust has a similar flexibility in governance. The
owenrs a business for profit." UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 6(1), 6 U.L.A. 526 (1995); REV. UNIF. P'SHIP
ACT § 202(a) (amended 1997). The definition thus includes individuals who may not have
intended to form a partnership. See, e.g., Bass v. Bass, 814 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Tenn. 1991) (holding
that "it is not essential that the parties actually intend to become partners.").
72 The control rights in a partnership extend even to ordinary, everyday matters of the
business. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 18(h), 6 U.L.A. 526 (1995); REV. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 4010)
(amended 1997).
73 UNIF. P'SHip ACT § 18(a), 6 U.L.A. 526 (1995); REV. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 401(b)
(amended 1997).
74 See Larry E.Ribstein, The Evolving Partnership,26 J. CORP. L. 819, 841-42 (2001) (noting
that "[e]quality rules for management . .. suit very closely held firms in which the partners'
combinations of capital, service, and credit contributions can be assumed to equalize."). But see
id. at 841 (questioning whether partner intent should sometimes overrule the default).
75 See, e.g., Day v. Sidley & Austin, 394 F. Supp. 986, 992 (D.D.C. 1975) (discussing how
"statutory rules governing the rights and duties of the partners are 'subject to any agreement
between them."').
76 See id. at 988 (discussing the centralized management structure of law firm partnership).
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common law trust has had a rocky history, as it has sometimes been
lumped in with partnerships, 77 and at other times has been judged to be
a corporation in trust's clothing. 78 This confusion over categorization
has hampered the use of the trust as a business organization. However,
the trust has dominated some types of business enterprises, such as
pension and investment funds. 79 Recently, trust law scholars have
argued that the business trust is underrated and that new statutory trusts
will provide a new venue for commercial enterprises. 80
The trust is generally recognized by its strict division between
principal and agent, as well as the strong fiduciary duties assumed by
the principal. The trust divides its relevant participants into trustees and
beneficiaries (or "beneficial owners"). 8 1 Trustees manage the assets of
the trust, and the beneficiaries receive the profits of this management.
Because trusts were traditionally donative transfers, beneficiaries had no
rights or expectations of control over the trustees, despite the trustee's
obligation to act on their behalf. However, the law did provide for
trustee oversight. Under the common law, the general duty of trustees
is "to exercise reasonable care in an effort to preserve the trust
property." 82 Trustees are thus liable for acting in their own interest or
for violating a duty of care, which is far stricter than the duty of care
under corporate law. For this reason, the trust was seen as an
inappropriate avenue for entrepreneurial enterprises. 83
The new statutory trusts provide for more flexibility in governance,
and allow the parties to structure the relationship between trustee and
beneficiary as they please. 84 Thus, theoretically, the commercial trust

77 Cox & Hazen, supra note 64, at 20.
78 See Herbert B. Chermside, Jr., Annotation, Modern Status of the Massachusetts or
Business Trust, 88 A.L.R.3d 704, 729-30 (1978).
79 See John H. Langbeinn, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of
Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 168-73 (1997).
80 Id. at 166-67; Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust as "'Uncorporation": A Research Agenda, 2005 U.
ILL. L. REV. 31, 35. There is an uncertain number of states with statutory trusts. Id. at 35 ("The
existing literature, such as it is, puts the count of states with general business trust legislation
anywhere from seventeen to thirty-four."). In 1988, Delaware established a statutory trust to
some fanfare. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3801-3824 (2007).
81 See, e.g., id. tit. 12, § 3801 (defining "statutory trust" as "an unincorporated association
which [i]s
created by a governing instrument under which ... business or professional activities
for profit are carried on or will be carried on, by a trustee or trustees or as otherwise provided in
the governing instrument for the benefit of such person or persons as are or may become
beneficial owners or as otherwise provided in the governing instrument ....).
82 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 232, cmt. c (1992).
83 Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations: Unraveling the
Mystery, 58 BUS. LAW. 559, 575-80 (2003).
84 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3806(a) (2007) ("Except to the extent otherwise
provided in the governing instrument of a statutory trust, the business and affairs of a statutory
trust shall be managed by or under the direction of its trustees. To the extent provided in the
governing instrument of a statutory trust, any person (including a beneficial owner) shall be
entitled to direct the trustees or other persons in the management of the statutory trust.").
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became a completely contractual enterprise-governance could be
structured in any way that the relevant parties desired. 85 But such
flexibility has thus far not led to a rush of new firms organized as
trusts. 86 In part, there is difficulty in establishing the background law
and default rules for this new form of organization. 87 As to the broader
issue, there is no norm of control in commercial trusts, and by extension
no norm that beneficiaries have a share of control proportionate to their
interests.
The default rules are a bit more structured for the limited
partnership, the limited liability partnership, and the limited liability
company. These organizations envision participants with stakes in the
residual who do not participate in management. For example, limited
partnerships must make clear who the managerial partners are, and who
the limited partners are. 88 Limited liability companies have what is
known as "chameleon" management: "the firm can choose either direct
partnership-type control by the members or centralized control by
managers that is closer to, but not as rigid as, the limited partnership
format." 89 Participants in these enterprises have substantial flexibility in
arranging the division of ownership and control rights. Thus, there is
likewise no "one share, one vote" norm in these structures. Instead,
voting rights are divided amongst the participants according to
agreement.
Finally, closely-held corporations have the same basic corporate
structure as publicly-held corporations: the shareholders elect the board
of directors, and the board appoints the officers who run the
corporation. In closely-held companies, however, these roles often
overlap, leading to a governance structure more akin to a partnership
than a large corporation.9" Many closely-held companies have different
85 See Tamar Frankel, The DelawareBusiness Trust Act Failureas the New Corporate Law,
23 CARDOZO L. REv. 325, 326 (2001) ("Moreover, the [Delaware] Act explicitly invites
commercial and manufacturing enterprises .. to take advantage of this marvelous contract-like
organizational form, emphasizing its liberal contractarian approach and the freedom to write into
or omit from the trust documents anything they wish, or almost anything.").
86 Id. at 327.
87 Id. at 328. Steven Schwarcz has argued that because of the background of trust law, "[t]he
degree to which assets need to be placed at risk in order to satisfy the expectations of residual
claimants thus provides a key to distinguishing commercial trusts from corporations." Schwarcz,
supra note 83, at 578.
88 See REV. UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 303 (amended 1985), 6A U.L.A. 144-45 (1995).
However, under the original Uniform Limited Partnership Act, limited partners may be subject to
liability as managing partners if they participate in the governance. UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 7
(1916), 6A U.L.A. 336 (1995) ("A limited partner shall not become liable as a general partner
unless.., he takes part in the control of the business.").
89 Ribstein, supra note 74, at 843.
90 See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass.
1975) (defining closely held corporations as having "(1) a small number of stockholders; (2) no
ready market for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority stockholder participation in the
management, direction and operations of the corporation.").
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classes of shares as a method of allocating control amongst different
groups of shareholders. 91 In addition, shareholders may agree to certain
voting arrangements, such as the pooling of votes into a voting trust or
agreeing to vote along certain lines. 92 These voting arrangements are
often executed to consolidate a group of disparate shareholders into a
majority or to provide protection to minority shareholders over certain
critical matters. 93 Because of the limited number of shareholders,
closely-held corporations often have a shareholder or a small group of
shareholders with actual majority control. Because of this, corporate
law generally protects minority shareholders against undue oppression.
Although such oppression may relate to the stake in the residual, it more
often relates to the ability of minority shareholders to partake in other
aspects of the corporate pie-namely, employment. 94 Thus, the
minority oppression doctrine recognizes that even if shareholders are all
sharing equally in the profits, a majority may still be oppressing
minority shareholders by failing to approve a dividend 95 or by not
providing employment or other opportunities within the company.96
Thus, despite the theoretical notion that a corporation is merely a
"nexus of contracts" between the various parties in the firm, 97 the
corporation has perhaps the most specific and structured system of
governance out of all of the forms of business organization. Business
organizations such as commercial trusts, partnerships, and LLCs give
their members lots of flexibility to construct the organization as they
desire. 98 The corporation, however, is run by a board of directors which
91 Preferred stock is particularly common in start-up corporations. Venture capital investors
prefer to invest with preferred stock, which converts into common stock with multiple voting
shares if certain triggers are reached. William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside:
Preferred Stock and Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REV. 891, 892 (2002) (noting that
"[c]onvertible preferred stock is the dominant financial contract in the venture capital market.").
92 See, e.g., Cox & HAZEN, supra note 64, at 388-93; FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION
LAW 486-96 (2000).
93 Perhaps the most famous example of such a trust involves the Ringling family of circus
fame. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum v. Ringling, 53 A.2d 441, 447 (Del. 1947) (upholding such a
trust).
94 See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976) (finding
"no legitimate business purpose" to the majority's decision to suspend a minority shareholder's
salary, fail to reelect him as a director, and fail to appoint him as an officer); Leslie v. Boston
Software Collaborative, Inc., 14 Mass. L. Rptr. 379 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2002) (minority
shareholder terminated from his position as treasurer by majority shareholders).
95 See, e.g., Naito v. H. Naito Corp., 35 P.3d 1068 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (ordering the
implementation of dividend policy).
96 For a further discussion of the protection of minority shareholders vis-A-vis the protection
of political minorities, see Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholderand Otherwise, 113 YALE
L.J. 119 (2003).
97 For a discussion of the "nexus of contracts" theory, see, for example, STEPHEN M.
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 27 (2002).
98 This may explain, in part, the enthusiasm that "nexus of contracts" supporters have for
business forms such as LLCs and partnerships. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?,
I BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 183, 185 (2004) (challenging "the assumption that the corporate form is
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has been elected by shareholders. This conflict between the flexibility
of the model and the strictures of reality presents problems for the
justifications behind "one share, one vote."
B.

A BriefHistory of the "One Share, One Vote"

As discussed above, other forms of business organizations
contemplate substantial overlap between those with an interest in the
residual and those with managerial control over the corporation. Such
overlap is generally not possible in the modem public corporation.
Instead, those investors who are given a residual interest must entrust
their funds to other individuals who will actually control the enterprise.
In order to deal with the greater diffusion of ownership contemplated
under corporate law, the system of governance allows the participants to
elect a central governing body, which then can make decisions in a
more organized and efficient fashion. 99 Shareholders thus retain a
modified form of control in the power to elect their representatives;
those representatives, in turn, have actual control over the running of the
firm.
How, then, was this control to be shared amongst shareholders?
The "one share, one vote" standard seems like a fairly straightforward
and natural way of structuring the power relations. In the early days of
the corporate form, however, shareholder ownership was not uniformly
distributed in the early corporate charters. For much of the nineteenth
century, the common law of corporations provided for a default rule of
one vote per person. 100 This method tracked the default partnership
rule, in which each partner has a vote regardless of his or her financial
interest in the partnership. One scholar found that more than a third of a
sample of corporate charters from 1825 to 1835 had a "one person, one
vote" system of governance. 10 1 Other charters provided a "prudent
mean," in the words of Alexander Hamilton, in trying to balance
between shareholders and shares. 10 2 Such charter provisions provided
that the votes-per-share would decrease as the individual shareholder
got more and more shares; a shareholder with five shares might get five
votes, but a shareholder with 100 shares might only get ten votes. 103 In
establishing a "prudent mean" system for the first Bank of the United
States, Hamilton rejected a one share, one vote system on the grounds
optimal for publicly held firms.").
99 See Bainbridge, Means and Ends, supra note 69, at 548 (discussing the means of corporate
governance through the board of directors).
100 Dunlavy, supra note 7, at 1354.
101 Id. at 1354-55.

102 Id. at 1356.
103 Id. at 1357.
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that it would allow a few large shareholders to "monopolize the power
10 4
and benefits of the bank."
Over the course of the nineteenth century, however, corporations
decisively moved away from quasi-partnership arrangements. By the
end of the 1800s, most states had retreated from mandatory or default
rules oriented toward limited the power of larger shareholders. 10 5 There
was a brief period around the turn of the century in which cumulative
10 6
voting for directors became a tool for protecting small shareholders.
And in the early twentieth century, states and corporations moved
toward a "one share, one vote" structure as a progressive response to the
increasing number of no-vote shares being issued. 10 7 The term
"shareholder democracy" stems from these efforts to make sure that
shareholders had a viable vote, both through the shares and through the
corporation's proxy machinery. 0 8
The "one share, one vote" movement reached its apex in 1988 with
the Security and Exchange Commission's adoption of Rule 19c-4.109
The rule required companies listed on the major exchanges to refrain
from issuing shares with disproportionate voting rights.10
Subsequently, however, the rule was struck down by the D.C. Circuit
and was never revived." 1 Exchanges now allow companies to issue
dual-class shares and still maintain their listings. 1 2 Despite the failure
of Rule 19c-4, however, the one-share, one-vote norm remains a
touchstone of corporate governance. Shareholder advocacy groups like
Institutional Shareholder Services look unfavorably upon dual class
structures. An unbalanced system of voting rights is likely to hurt a
company's corporate governance rating, which may in turn affect how
institutional shareholders treat the company." 3 The media has also
104 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, IST CONG., REPORT ON A NATIONAL BANK, H.R. (1790),

reprinted in 2 THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES app.
2032, 2049 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1834).
105 Dunlavy, supra note 7, at 1358-59.
106 Id. at 1362.
107 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19c-4, 69 WASH. U.
L.Q. 565, 569 (1991) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Rule 1 9c-4].
108 Dunlhvy, supra note 7, at 1363-66.
109 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4 (1988), invalidated by Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406
(D.C.C.1990).
110 At the time, some companies had issued a new class of stock, as a dividend to current
shareholders, that provided an abnormally large number of votes per share. However, these new

shares were not transferable, and could only be sold if they were converted to regular one-vote
shares of common stock. The effect of such an issuance was to provide "lock in" power for longterm shareholders and/or managers. See Bainbridge, Rule 19c-4, supra note 107, at 566.
111Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d 406.

112 See, e.g., NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 313(B) (2005).
113 See, e.g., Kathleen Pender, Google's Weak Governance Rating, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 24,

2004, at C I (noting that "Google's low mark was largely a result of its dual-share-class structure,
which gives founders and other insiders 10 times as many votes per share as outside
stockholders.").
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latched onto the one-share, one-vote refrain as a litmus test for fair
14
treatment of shareholders.'
This Article is primary concerned with the role of one-share, onevote not in practice, but in theory. The norm is more foundational in the
economic theory of corporate law than it has been in practice. As
discussed below, the norm connects the shareholder franchise to the
maximization of social welfare. This connection plays a critical role in
justifying shareholder primacy, the theoretical basis for the bulk of
corporate law scholarship.
C.

The Theoretical Underpinningsof "One Share, One Vote"

If we consider the shareholder franchise along traditional voting
rights analysis, we must look at the voting system as a preference
aggregation system. The purpose of allowing a vote is to determine the
preferences of those who are voting. Elections can be adjusted based on
the strengths, divergences, and time-sensitive nature of the preferences
at issue. But at root, as discussed in Part I, the purpose of a voting
system is to provide a way for a group to sort its preferences along the
axis of a particular decision.
If we look at shareholder suffrage in this way, we immediately are
struck by the fact that it is only shareholders who are having their
preferences aggregated.
The corporation encompasses the daily
activities of a variety of different players: directors, officers, executives,
management, and employees.
Moreover, there are outside
"stakeholders" who have interests in the activities of the corporation
akin to shareholders: bondholders, suppliers, customers, even the
community at large. However, when it comes to aggregating the
preferences of the polity, in order to determine the leadership of the
corporation, only shareholders are invited to participate.
The
shareholder franchise only assesses shareholder preferences.
The primary normative justification for shareholder voting is the
theory of shareholder primacy. Shareholder primacy is the primary
theoretical driver not only for the vote, but also for such key concepts as
the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. Shareholder primacy essentially
means that corporations exist to serve the interests of shareholders. 115
Put more specifically, the theory mandates that the corporation be run
with the goal of maximizing shareholder wealth.
114 See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, One Share, One Vote: One Big Test, N.Y. TIMES, April 2,
2006, at 3 1.
115 See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 277 (1998)
("The structure of corporate law ensures that corporations generally operate in the interests of
shareholders.").

2008]

ONE SHARE, ONE VOTE

Shareholder primacy could simply be viewed as a democratic
legitimacy argument: the corporation has to keep shareholder interests
at the forefront because shareholders are the voting polity. But this puts
the cart before the horse: after all, who made the shareholders the voting
polity? The choice of this group as the enfranchised citizenry is what
needs justifying. A variant of this justification is that shareholders are
the corporation's "owners" and thus are entitled to the ownership rights
of profits and control."16 However, the ownership justification is also
17
doomed by its circularity: who made the shareholders the "owners"?"
As corporate law commentators have convincingly pointed out,
shareholders simply purchase a set of rights from the corporation. The
right to vote is made part of the stock ownership "bundle," but a stock
could be constructed (and has at times been constructed) without the
right to elect directors. 1 8 Even shareholders with the right to vote do
not possess many of the rights that traditionally accrue to property
owners-the right to exclude, for example, or the right of possession.' 19
Labeling shareholders "owners" is no more of a justification for the vote
than is labeling them "voters."
In their foundational work The Economic Structure of Corporate
Law, Easterbrook and Fischel provided a justification for shareholder
primacy theory beyond simple labels. 120
In looking to ground
shareholder primacy in economic theory, they looked to the traditional
economic utility rationale of creating the highest level of efficiency or
overall social utility. 12 1 Shareholder primacy theory argues that
maximizing shareholder wealth will generate the highest amount of
surplus and thus will result in the greatest overall social utility. 122 This
premise returns us to the "nexus of contracts" model. 123 Instead of
being the "owners" of the corporation, shareholders were one group of
many whose contracts with one another jointly created the fictional

116 The classic example of this perspective is Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of
Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32-33, 122-26.
117 See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1190-92 (2002) ("[T]he claim that shareholders own the public corporation
simply is empirically incorrect.").
118 See Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common
Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 694 (1986) (discussing the practice
of selling shares without the right to vote).
119 Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 733,
754 (2007).
120 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 35-39.
121 Id. at 35-39.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 1-39; Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11 (1976)
(suggesting that nature of firm as nexus for contracting relationships moots discussions of precise
corporate boundaries).
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corporate "entity."1 24 However, shareholders were the sole "residual
claimants:" that is, their returns were not payable until the other
contractual participants--creditors, employees, customers, suppliershad been fully satisfied. 25 This perspective assumes that all other
claimants have rigidly-set contractual entitlements, such that paying
them more than their entitlement would be akin to a gift. Because
shareholders are not paid until these set contractual payments have been
made, all other claimants received their contractual entitlements, and the
shareholders benefited from the maximization of the residual. As
Easterbrook and Fischel write:
As residual claimants, shareholders have the appropriate
incentives.., to make discretionary decisions.... Those with fixed
claims on the income stream may receive only a tiny benefit (in
increased security) from the undertakings of a new project. The
shareholders receive most of the marginal gains and incur most of
the marginal costs. They therefore have the right incentives to
26
exercise discretion. 1
Although shareholders do not directly exercise this discretion, their
appointed agents do. And these agents realize that they will be ousted
from the board and from managerial positions if they fail to do their job
of maximizing the surplus.
Thus, shareholder voting is not the cause of shareholder primacyinstead, it is simply one of its reinforcing mechanisms. Of course, as
has been dogma since the seminal work of Adolf Berle and Gardiner
Means, the shareholder vote in publicly-held companies has not been a
27
particularly effective way of maintaining shareholder primacy.
Shareholder votes have been generally an empty exercise in rubberstamping the slate of candidates nominated by the board. But this is an
oversimplification.
At the level of closely-held corporations,
shareholder votes are a much livelier affair. Here, shareholder primacy
is generally effectuated directly by the shareholders themselves through
the vote. Even in publicly held companies, a majority or even a
properly situated minority shareholder has the power to appoint its
representatives to the board and thus control the corporation's fate.
It is the power of a "controlling" interest 28 that drives the law and
economics of shareholder voting.
At a traditional publicly held
corporation, the individual shareholder has little or no motivation to
monitor the company or even vote in the election. But when those votes
124
125
126
127

EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 36.
Id. at 36-37.
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 68.
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 6.

128 A majority will have de jure control, but a minority interest may also have de facto control
over the corporation. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994)
(finding ownership of 44% of shares to be a controlling interest).
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are amassed together into a controlling interest, they can vote out the
current board-often immediately. 129 The shareholders' votes can be
amassed through the mechanism of a tender offer-an offer by one
entity to buy 50% or more of the company's shares. The market for
corporate control imposes the market discipline necessary to effectuate
the shareholder primacy norm. If the shareholders are ignored or
unhappy, they can sell their shares to another entity that can
agglomerate the shares into a majority holding. This new majority
holder then can take complete control and make the profits that prior
management had failed to generate. In this way, the market for
corporate control leads to greater efficiency: the shareholders can sell
their shares at a premium, and the acquirer can realize the benefits of
control. This potential for market discipline keeps the board and
130
management focused on the shareholders' interests.
The economic benefits of the market for corporate control only
occur if shareholders (as a whole) maintain control over the board as
well as the ability to transfer that control. This is why the shareholders'
interest in the residual profits is linked to their control of the
corporation. Otherwise, the critical link between having control and
maximizing the residual would be broken.
"One share, one vote" is a "logical consequence" of the theory of
shareholder primacy.' 31 The "one share, one vote" rule requires that
each share of stock have equal voting weight with all other shares. In
this way, the voting interest is equal to the interest in the residual.
Shares with disproportionate voting power create skewed incentives.
As Easterbrook and Fischel argue, "[t]hose with disproportionate voting
power will not receive shares of the residual gains or losses from new
endeavors and arrangements commensurate with their control; as a
result, they will not make optimal decisions." 132 As a result, those with
control will have the incentive to seek disproportionate gains that do not
directly inure to the owners of the residual. 133 The residual will no
longer be maximized, discouraging equity investment and leading to a
129 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (allowing a majority of shareholders to execute any action
that may be taken at a shareholders' meeting (including removal of directors) through a written

concurrence of those shareholders),
130 See Edelman & Thomas, supra note 12, at 454 (discussing the importance of shareholder
votes in the takeover setting).
131 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 73 ("Votes follow the residual interest in the
firm, and unless each element of the residual interest carries an equal voting right, there will be a

needless agency cost of management.").
132 Id. at 73. See also Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of
CorporateLaw, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1911, 1945-46 (1996) ("The case for the one share, one vote
rule turns primarily on its ability to match economic incentives with voting power and to preserve

the market for corporate control as a check on bad management.").
133 See Hu & Black, supra note 13, at 851 (discussing concerns that controlling shareholders
without a commensurate economic stake in the corporation are more likely to "tunnel" away a
disproportionate share of firm value).
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decline in societal efficiency.
A similar concern about incentives lies behind the prohibition on
selling a share's voting rights separately from the share itself. State
corporate law does not permit a shareholder to disengage the right to
vote from the share and sell it permanently. 134 In addition, there are
generally restrictions against buying a vote in a particular election or
bribing a shareholder to vote a certain way.' 35 Such restrictions may
seem counter to the general corporate law preference for private
ordering through contract. But vote selling is problematic for the same
reason as disproportionate voting: it disengages control rights from the
rights to the residual. 136 It may make sense for an individual
shareholder to sell the vote, given that the value of the vote for any
individual share in a public corporation is close to zero. 137 However,
the sale gives greater control to a holder that does not have an
equivalent interest in the residual. To some extent, these problems are
similar to those related to tender offers; individual shares are worth less
when sold individually than their per capita value when agglomerated
into a control group. But there is also a separate problem, in that those
selling their votes get all of the benefits of the sale but only a fraction of
the costs. 138 At root, the problem of control without equity interest
would remain, and all shares would be less valuable.
Thus, the theory of shareholder primacy rests on the notion that
shareholders will improve social welfare by focusing on increasing the
corporation's residual profits. Shareholder primacy is enforced through
shareholder voting and by the market for corporate control which uses
the shareholder vote to effectuate changes in management. Essential to
the theory is the notion of shareholder homogeneity: namely, that
shareholders all share a common, homogeneous interest in increasing
residual profits.
However, this essential aspect of the theory simply is not true.
Shareholders are not homogeneous in the interests-in new ways as
well as old. The next section discusses the axes along which the
commonality of shareholder interests may splinter.
134 See, e.g., Hall v. Isaacs, 146 A.2d 602 (Del. Ch. 1958).
135 See Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 26 (Del. Ch. 1982) (noting that individual instances
of vote-buying are "easily susceptible of abuse" and thus "subject to a test for intrinsic fairness").
136 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 74 ("Separation of shares from votes
introduces a disproportion between expenditure and reward.").
137 This is based on the notion that any individual vote has an extremely low probability of
affecting the outcome. See Yair J. Listokin, ManagementAlways Wins the Close Ones 16 (Yale
Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 348, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=980695
(noting that "management sponsored proposals typically pass easily" with a mean approval rate of
85 percent).
138 Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce Kobayashi, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 21, 39 (2006) ("Vote buying
and selling can, however, be inefficient in some situations because it enables the buyer and the
seller to realize gains while losses are incurred by other shareholders.").
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THE PROBLEMATIC ASSUMPTION OF SHAREHOLDER HOMOGENEITY

In their recent article on encumbered shares, Martin and Partnoy
state: "It is simply not true that the 'preferences of [shareholders] are
likely to be similar if not identical. '"l 39 Martin and Partnoy focus on the
problems caused by equity derivatives which carve up various
shareholder rights into discrete financial securities. However, there are
many ways in which shareholders fail to share common interestsmany opportunities for conflict along what has been called "horizontal
power relations."' 40 These conflicts are explored further below.
A.

The Problem of the Control Group: Majority Rule and Minority
Oppression

The notion of shareholder homogeneity assumes that all
shareholders are similarly situated and share similar interests. However,
shareholders may have very different economic interests depending on a
variety of factors. Perhaps the most fundamental difference is the
difference between a shareholder in a control group and a shareholder
who is not in a control group. A corporation does not necessarily have a
control group-for example, if shares are distributed widely amongst
public shareholders with no one holding over five percent. But if a
corporation-public or closely held-has a control entity or control
group, then the interests of the majority are likely to differ from those of
the minority.
The primary benefit of control is the right to apportion the benefits
of control entirely to oneself while sharing the costs of such control
with the minority shareholders. For example, Corporation X has A as a
52 percent shareholder, while the remaining shareholders B, C, & D
each own 16 percent. If A appoints herself as the chief executive
officer, she will get 100% of the benefits of her salary. However, since
the corporation as a whole pays the salary, A will only incur (by
extension) 52 percent of the costs. Similarly, if A sells a valuable
company asset to another company which she owns by herself, she will
have a strong incentive to underprice the asset. In her management of
the corporation, A will have a clear incentive to use her control to drain
away corporate assets for her own personal benefit.
The structure of the corporation's control mechanisms is ill139 Martin & Partnoy, supra note 9, at 778 (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Voting in CorporateLaw, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 405 (1983)) (alteration in original).
140 Dunlavy, supra note 7, at 1351-52, 1351 fig.1.
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equipped to deal with this basic problem. Most corporations are
arranged under a "majority rules" system in which each director is
elected by a majority vote of all of the shareholders. In some states, the
"straight voting" system is counterbalanced by a system of cumulative
voting, in which each shareholder has a set of votes to distribute among
the entire slate of directors. 141 Cumulative voting allows for minority
shareholders to have representation on the board. But cumulative
voting is relatively rare, especially in Delaware corporations, 142 and
even under cumulative voting the majority shareholder still controls the
corporation. The system of "majority control" sets up the fundamental
problem of minority shareholders not having any control or even
input.

143

This structural problem has led to supplemental doctrines intended
to ameliorate or eliminate the effects of majority rule. The duty of
loyalty, for example, is an implied, mandatory duty for all corporate
directors and officers. It requires them to act in the interests of the
corporation as a whole, rather than in their own personal interests.
Because the duty applies to directors, it applies by extension to majority
shareholders, as their board representative will be subject to this duty.
However, controlling shareholders also have a duty of loyalty to the
corporation's minority shareholders. 144 The duty of loyalty has a
structural element, in that conflict transactions can find a safe harbor
through approval by a majority of shareholders or independent
directors. 145 However, in Delaware such transactions can also survive
the conflict through an after-the-fact "entire fairness" test. 146 Thus,
there is some flexibility and discretion in the administration of the duty.
The duty of care is also a mechanism for constraining the majority.
The duty requires directors and officers to act with the level of ordinary
care expected of a reasonably prudent person. 147 This rule is designed
more to counteract agency costs, but it does prevent the majority from
running the company in a way that may seem irrational to others.
However, the strength of the rule is severely limited by the business
141 See COX & HAZEN, supra note 64, at 348-5 1.
142 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative
Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 124 (1994).
143 Note that this is different than the "agency costs" problem which seems to (pre)occupy
most corporate law scholars.
144 See Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. 1994) ("A controlling
or dominating shareholder standing on both sides of a transaction ... bears the burden of proving
its entire fairness.").
145 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2007).

146Id. § 144(a)(3) ("The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time it is
authorized, approved or ratified, by the board of directors, a committee or the shareholders.").
For a discussion of the entire fairness test, see Cinerama Inc. v. Technicolor Inc., 663 A.2d 1156,
1178-79 (Del. 1995).
147 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (2003).
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judgment rule, which provides that directors and officers are free to use
their own business judgment in making managerial decisions. 48 As a
result, the duty of care has largely become simply a mechanism for
requiring directors and officers to be appropriately informed about the
corporation's operations and financial health. 149 In the past, the doctrine
of ultra vires was also used to cabin the majority's discretion on
business matters. The doctrine held that corporate directors and officers
were not permitted to act on behalf of the corporation outside the scope
of the corporation's purpose. However, given the expansive and nonspecific nature of most corporations' "corporate purposes," as
designated in the corporate charter, the ultra vires doctrine no longer
has much effect.
Finally, the doctrine of minority oppression is designed as a
backstop in cases involving matters in which the majority generally has
discretion to operate. The doctrine is generally applied to closely-held
corporations in which shareholders participate in the company as both
shareholders and employees. Because there is no outside market for
shares in a closely-held corporation, shareholders cannot sell their
shares and exit if they disagree with the majority's direction. The
difficulty of exit has led some courts to rule that shareholders in closelyheld corporations must treat each other as more akin to partners and
with the "utmost good faith and loyalty."' 150 This duty is defined
ambiguously in order to capture a range of discretionary activities that
do not breach other fiduciary duties on their face. 15 1 They generally
entail participation in the corporation that is controlled by the majority
shareholder but is in some way expected to be shared by minority
shareholders. As one court put it:
A shareholder who reasonably expected that ownership in the
corporation would entitle him or her to a job, a share of corporate
earnings, a place in corporate management, or some other form of
security, would be oppressed in a very real sense when others in the
corporation seek to defeat those expectations and there exists no
52
effective means of salvaging the investment. 1
In his article on the history of the shareholder primacy norm,
Gordon Smith argued that in the nineteenth century the norm served as

148 For an example of the discretion given to directors under the business judgment rule, see
Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (11. App. Ct. 1968).
149 See, e.g., In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
150 Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975).
151See Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 Bus.
LAW. 699, 711-12 (1993) (noting that minority oppression has been defined as "burdensome,
harsh and wrongful conduct," "a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing," and
"frustration of the reasonable expectations of the shareholders").
152 In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984).

CARDOZO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 30:2

the foundation for the doctrine of minority oppression.1 53 According to
Smith, notions of shareholder primacy were actually generated to
resolve horizontal conflicts between different groups of shareholders.
As he points out, the seminal "shareholder primacy" case-Dodge v.
FordMotor Co. 154-actually involved a dispute between two groups of
shareholders about the direction of the company. 155 In Dodge, the court
required Ford Motor to issue dividends to its stockholders. The court
used the language of shareholder primacy to compel the controlling
shareholder (Ford) to distribute profits to minority shareholders (the
Dodge brothers). Refusal to issue dividends is a classic example of
minority oppression. Smith pointed out that this development of the
shareholder primacy doctrine has much more to do with horizontal
relations between shareholders and much less to do with the vertical
relations between directors, shareholders, and other corporate
56
constituents.
Thus, there are a number of "softer" doctrines designed to deal
with the structural differences between the interests of majority and
minority shareholders. However, as has been noted, finding a balance
between these interests can be difficult to achieve, since the majority
has legitimate interests in exercising its right of control. 157 These
interests will conflict with those of minority shareholders, particularly
over issues such as control of the corporation, employment
opportunities, dividends, and other means of sharing the surplus.
B.

The Problem ofDifferential Voting Powers Amongst Shares

As discussed above, 58 the efficiency of the "one share, one vote"
hypothesis assumes that each share has the right to an equal share of the
residual interest. Otherwise, voting shareholders will have different
incentives depending on the ratio of voting power to residual interests.
153 Smith, supra note 115.
154 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
155 Smith, supra note 115, at 315-20.
156 Id. at 322-23. Smith argued that ultimately the shareholder primacy norm is largely
irrelevant to corporate law and corporate business decisions. Id.
157 See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376, 1380-81 (Del. 1993) (noting that "well
established in our jurisprudence that stockholders need not always be treated equally for all
purposes" and arguing it is "inappropriate judicial legislation ... to fashion a special judiciallycreated rule for minority investors"); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657,
663 (Mass. 1976) (noting that the minority oppression doctrine should not "unduly hamper [the
majority's] effectiveness in managing the corporation in the best interests of all concerned.");
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of FiduciaryDuty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
1675, 1688 (1990) ("The application of strict fiduciary standards to close corporations deprives
controlling shareholders of the ability to manage the corporation-to use their own property-as
they see fit.").
158 See supra Part ILA.
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A shareholder with strong voting power but little interest in the residual

will have different incentives than those with less voting power and
greater stake in the profits. Easterbrook and Fischel noted that the
"most basic statutory rule" of shareholder voting was the default rule of
one share, one vote, and that this was "the same in every state.' 59 They
60
also claimed that agreements to alter this default rule were rare.

However, there is evidence that they may have been writing at the high
water mark of such a norm, and that differential voting powers amongst
16
shares may be more common than in the past. '
Easterbrook and Fischel were writing in the wake of the Security
and Exchange Commission's adoption of Rule 19c-4.162 The rule
required that self-regulatory organizations, such as the New York Stock

Exchange or NASDAQ,

prohibit listed companies from issuing

securities that reduced the rights of existing shareholders. The purpose
of the rule was to reinforce the "one share, one vote" standard by
163
prohibiting the issuance of shares with disproportionate voting rights.

However, the rule was struck down by the D.C. Circuit and was never
revived.

64

Currently, the exchanges allow companies with multiple-

class shares to be listed; however, certain safeguards are required for
65
companies with these shares. 1
Although scholars still call for the abolition of dual class voting
structures, 166 they appear to be here to stay. Several recent shareholder

controversies have involved corporations with dual class shares. Both
the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal are controlled by
families with shares that have voting power disproportionate to their
economic stake. 167 Critics have claimed that the controlling families do
not have the proper incentives because they do not have the same
159 EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL, supra note 5, at 72.
160 Id.
161 Martin & Partnoy, supra note 9, at 784-85 (noting that Easterbrook and Fischel derived this
conclusion from a "relatively stable period" in which the New York Stock Exchange refused to
list companies with nonvoting shares).
162 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4 (1988), invalidated by Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C.

Cir. 1990).
163 At the time, some companies had issued a new class of stock, as a dividend to current
shareholders, that provided an abnormally large number of votes per share. However, these new
shares were not transferable, and could only be sold if they were converted to regular one-vote
shares of common stock. The effect of such an issuance was to provide "lock in" power for longterm shareholders and/or managers. See Bainbridge, Rule 19c-4, supra note 107, at 566.
164 See Roundtable, 905 F.2d 406.
165 See, e.g., NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 313(B) (2005).
166 See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why
Importing U.S. CorporateLaw Isn't the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1153 (2004)
(arguing that dual class voting structures could be prohibited as a way of protecting minority
shareholder interests).
167 The Bancroft family is in the midst of selling the Dow Jones Company, the parent
company to the Journal. Frank Ahrens, Murdoch Seizes Wall St. Journal in $5 Billion Coup,
WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2007, at Al.
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economic risk as the other shareholders. 168 However, such criticisms
are subject to the rebuttal that shareholders knew what they were getting
when they purchased the stock. Indeed, that is the general justification
for multiple-vote or no-vote shares: corporate law should facilitate
private ordering, which includes the possibility that certain shareholders
will accept less control as part of the bargain. Less control probably
means a cheaper price, and shareholders should be permitted to make
this bargain if they wish to do so. However, from the perspective of
shareholder wealth maximization, shareholders with more control and
less risk will have skewed incentives in maximizing shareholder wealth.
In addition to dual class shareholders, there are certain groups of
shareholders-primarily holders of preferred shares-who have voting
rights that change based on the circumstances. The primary purpose of
a preferred share is to give the holder the right to a regular dividend of a
specific amount. Holders of preferred shares do not generally have
straightforward voting rights within the corporation on matters such as
the election of directors. However, many preferred shares have clauses
that give each preferred share the right to vote under certain
circumstances, such as the failure to pay the regular dividend. Often,
preferred shares are given some multiple of common share votes for
each share-for example, ten votes in the election for each share of
preferred stock. Thus, once certain circumstances trigger these rights,
preferred shareholders go from non-voters to super-voters. Bondholders
may also have similar clauses of protection when, for example, the
corporation misses a payment.
Thus, the notion of a uniform shareholder polity is often factually
incorrect. Dual class shares, as well as convertible shares, provide
control rights to groups that are not aligned with those groups' interests
in the residual. In fact, preferred shares often give voting rights in order
to give the holders of such shares in certain circumstances the right to
trump the concerns of the common shareholders.
C.

The Problem of Shareholder Vote Buying and Voting Trusts

Corporate law generally prohibits shareholders from selling their
right to vote without simultaneous transfer of the underlying interest in
the residual. 69 The converse is also true, although courts have allowed
for the theoretical possibility that the seller of stock could retain the
168 See, e.g., Rob Kellogg, Dual-Class Equity Structures, RISK & GOVERNANCE BLOG, Apr.
20, 2006, http://blog.riskmetrics.com/2006/04/dualclass-equity-structuressub.html; Bill Mann,
Dual-Class Shares, Second Class Investors, MOTLEY FOOL, Apr.
14, 2004,
http://www.fool.com/investing/generalU2004/04/14/dualclass-shares-secondclass-investors.aspx.
169 Hall v. Isaacs, 146 A.2d 602 (Del. Ch. 1958).
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vote in order to protect a legal interest. 170 However, there has been a
shift in the law with regard to bribery-paying a shareholder to vote a
particular way. In the past, vote bribery was not permitted-it was seen
as a violation of a shareholder's duty to other shareholders. 17 1 Over
time, however, the rule has shifted to a more permissive stance.
In Schreiber v. Carney,172 the company was seeking shareholder
approval of a corporate restructuring in the wake of a merger. The
company, Texas International Airlines, needed shareholder approval,
and it needed majority approval from each class of stock, which
included not only common stock but also three series of convertible
preferred stock. Jet Capital held a majority of shares in one of the
preferred stock series as well as warrants for a large number of common
shares. Jet determined that if the restructuring went through, it would
incur a large tax liability unless it had already exercised the warrants.
However, it did not have enough cash on hand to exercise the warrants.
Thus, it decided that it would have to vote against the merger. In order
to resolve this difficulty, Texas International decided to lend money to
Jet so that it could exercise the warrants.
The Delaware Chancery Court upheld the loan against a challenge
of vote buying. The court recognized two principles behind the general
prohibition against vote buying: (1) protecting shareholders against
fraud and deceit, and (2) requiring shareholders to exercise their own
independent judgment. 173 The court found no hint of fraud or deceit in
the instant case, as it was in other shareholders' interests to bribe Jet
into voting for the restructuring. In fact, Texas International had
secured approval for the loan from other shareholders. 74 The court
recognized that shareholders had different interests and that it may be in
the interests of certain shareholders to work with other shareholders in
developing a negotiated solution. As for the independent judgment
principle, its traditional justification was that "by requiring each
stockholder to exercise his individual judgment as to all matters
presented, [t]he security of the small stockholders is found in the natural
disposition of each stockholder to promote the best interests of all, in

170 See, e.g., Commonwealth Assocs. v. Providence Health Care, 641 A.2d 155, 158 (Del. Ch.
1993) (expressing "doubt whether, in a post record-date sale of corporate stock, a negotiated
provision in which a beneficial owner/seller specifically retained the 'dangling' right to vote as of
the record date, would be a legal, valid and enforceable provision, unless the seller maintained an
interest sufficient to support the granting of an irrevocable proxy with respect to the shares").
171See, e.g., Cone's Ex'rs v. Russell, 21 A. 847, 849 (N.J. Ch. 1891).
172 447 A.2d 17 (Del. Ch. 1982).
173 Id. at 24. The court cited to Cone's for the proposition that "[t]he security of the small
stockholders is found in the natural disposition of each stockholder to promote the best interests
of all, in order to promote his individual interests." Cone's Ex 'rs, 21 A. at 849.
174 Schreiber, 447 A.2d at 20 (noting that the other shareholders "voted overwhelmingly in
favor of the proposal.").
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order to promote his individual interests. ' 175 However, the court found
that this rationale was "obsolete because it is both impracticable and
impossible of application to modem corporations with many widely
scattered stockholders."' 176 Instead, the court held the loan transaction to
177
a standard of entire fairness.
Voting trusts are somewhat analogous to vote buying in that two
voters agree to bind their votes to each other, rather than to their
The Delaware corporation statute, for
independent self-interest.
example, allows parties to contract with each other to vote the same
way. 178 The statute allows for a great deal of flexibility-one party may
agree to vote as directed by another party in exchange for consideration.
In addition, parties may put their shares into a voting trust that is
What these arrangements
subsequently voted by a trustee. 179
demonstrate is that corporations are not simply a mass of like-minded
individuals who are all voting based upon the same self-interest.
Instead, conflicts between shareholders may arise, and corporate law
allows for mechanisms to resolve them contractually. Given the
emphasis on private ordering in corporation law generally, it would
make sense to allow for these private arrangements. However, these
arrangements contradict the notion of shareholders as a mass of
undifferentiated seekers with a singular goal.
D.

The Problem of Hedging the Residual Interest

As discussed above, selling the vote separately from the stock is
generally prohibited, and vote "bribes" are subject to the fairly rigorous
"entire fairness" scrutiny. However, new financial derivative products
are making it easier to vote in shareholder elections while at the same
time having interests divergent from traditional shareholder interests. In
effect, shareholders are able to engage in "empty voting," in which they
vote their shares without having the same financial stake in the game
that other shareholders have.
How does this work? The simplest way is to purchase shares in the
company while simultaneously "shorting" the stock. The stock can be
shorted through equity derivatives that increase in value as the share

175 Id.at 24.
176 Id. at 25 (quoting 5 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2066 (perm. ed.)); see also
id. ("[A] shareholder may exercise wide liberality of judgment in the matter of voting, and it is
not objectionable that his motives may be for personal profit, or determined by whims or caprice,
so long as he violates no duty owed his fellow stockholders.").
177 Id.

178 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 218(c) (2007).
179 Id. at tit. 8, § 218(a).
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price falls.180 Thus, a party will have countervailing interests-the
stock will still have its residual attached, but the "short" position will
reward a drop in price for the stock. If the short position is strong
enough, the shareholder will actually be encouraged to act against the
interests of the corporation in order to trigger a decrease in the share
price. There are also less extreme possibilities that would nevertheless
allow shareholders to vote despite a complex set of interests that do not
overlap with other shareholders.
For example, in 2004, Perry
Corporation bought 9.9% of the shares in Mylan Labs and voted in
favor of a merger between Mylan and King Pharmaceuticals.' 8 1 Perry
acquired the stake because it owned King, and it wanted Mylan to agree
to the merger. However, Perry also hedged its voting stake in Mylan
through a series of equity swaps and other undisclosed transactions.
Thus, Perry acquired voting power in Mylan while simultaneously
hedging the residual interest in Mylan. Perry was sued by another
Mylan shareholder for voting without true economic ownership;
however, the case was rendered moot when Mylan called off the merger
with King.
Another potential for vote buying is through the borrowing of
shares specifically around the record date-the date on which
shareholders are locked in as the voting polity for purposes of the
election at hand.1 82 The purpose of this transaction is to borrow the
share specifically for the vote, and then return it to the original owner
after the vote. Lending shares for a short period of time is a fairly
common practice; it is designed to facilitate short-selling by making the
shares available for sale when the short comes due. But if the
borrowing is done not to facilitate a short sale, but rather to allow a
borrower to vote without economic risk, the practice looks fairly close
to vote selling.
Why would shareholders lend their votes to someone elsesomeone whose interests might be counter to theirs? The main reason is
money coupled with ignorance. Financial institutions can lend out the
shares for a fee and make money while at the same time keeping the
share and the residual. Given the lack of importance or drama in most
shareholder votes, these institutions have not really focused on the
possibility that borrowers could be targeting shares not to facilitate a
short, but rather for the vote. In fact, fund managers have been caught
unawares by borrowers who use the vote contrary to the managers'
interests.1 83 As the practice becomes more widespread, shareholders
180 Martin & Partnoy, supra note 9, at 778, n.14.
181 Hu & Black, supra note 13, at 828.
182 Id. at 832.
183 Id. at 834 (discussing share borrowing in the case of British Land, including the role of one
fund manager who unknowingly lent stock to an opponent in the contest).
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will likely take more steps to prevent "vote borrowing." But the
complexity of many of these transactions may make such monitoring
more and more difficult.

E.

The Problem of Management, Employee, and Pension Fund
Shareholders

When considering the kaleidoscope of potential financial interests
amongst shareholders, there is one financial interest that perhaps is
more important than all of the others-employment. For most, the job
is the single most important financial interest that they have. In a
diversified portfolio, shares in one particular company are close to
irrelevant-it is the overall health of the portfolio that matters.
However, one cannot diversify one's employment portfolio to any
significant degree. Thus, if one holds a job and shares at a particular
company, the effect of the vote on one's employment is likely to
determine how one would choose to vote the shares.
Certainly, there are similarities between the interests of a
shareholder and the interests of an employee. Both wish the company
to perform well.
But within the organization, shareholders and
employees have different interests when it comes to issues like the level
of risk the company should bear, how employees are to be compensated,
and how the surplus is to be split. Particularly when it comes to
mergers and acquisitions, employees might have very different interests
from shareholders if the transaction will bring downsizing or worker
replacement. 84 Conversely, employees with shares as well as stock
options might choose to vote their shares so as to increase the potential
for upside risk.185 Stock options may have led employees to favor a
strategy of short-term stock appreciation without due regard for the
potential for down-side risk.1 86 In the late 1990s, employees may have
been more concerned about their stock and stock option holdings than
their job; but as shareholders, they had different interests than those
87
shareholders who did not also hold options. 1
184 See Matthew T. Bodie, Workers, Information, and Corporate Combinations: The Casefor
Nonbinding Employee Referenda in Transformative Transactions, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 871
(2008) (discussing employee interests in merger and acquisition decisions).
185 Martin & Partnoy, supra note 9, at 792.
186 Since stock options offer the chance for the holder to buy the stock at a certain strike price,
the options are worth the same (nothing) whether the stock drops to $1 below the strike price or

$100 below the strike price. This incentive scheme may have led to management and employees
undervaluing excessive downside risk, including the risk that financial misreporting would come
to light. See Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time Warner and the False God of ShareholderPrimacy,
31 J. CORP. L. 975, 995-97 (2006) [hereinafter Bodie, AOL Time Warner].
187 Matthew T. Bodie, Aligning Incentives with Equity: Employee Stock Options and Rule 10b5, 88 IOWA L. REv. 539, 546-50 (2003).
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Pension fund shareholders have received significant attention lately
for their increasingly visible activities in the realm of corporate
governance. Teaming with other institutional investors, pension funds
have taken the lead in promoting greater shareholder involvement in
corporate issues such as shareholder nominations for directors and
approval of executive compensation. For example, AFSCME was the
lead plaintiff in a recent Second Circuit decision permitting
shareholders to propose easier shareholder access for board
nominations. 188 Some commentators who are otherwise committed to
shareholder primacy draw a distinction between these activist pension
fund shareholders and other shareholders.1 89 Since pension funds are
often run by unions, commentators accuse pension fund leaders of
pursuing their own pro-worker agenda when it comes to shareholder
proposals, director votes, and other shareholder matters. 190 Manager
discretion is limited, as ERISA requires pension fund managers to run
the fund in the interests of the fund participants. But there is room
within this discretion to pursue various agendas that have ramifications
beyond corporate governance and share price.
Specifically singled out are pension funds for government
employees. For years the biggest player in the corporate governance
arena was CalPERS, the pension fund for approximately 1.5 million
California state and local employees. The CalPERS Board is made up
of directors elected by the fund participants, directors appointed by the
governor along with other state officials, and ex officio directors who
are state officials or agency appointees. 191 CalPERS has long been
active in corporate governance and has its own "Focus List" of
companies that had questionable corporate governance practices. 192
However, CalPERS has been criticized for pursuing its governance
agendas overzealously and for caring more about workers' rights than
profits. For example, the CalPERS corporate governance campaign
against Safeway was characterized as a "jihad"; critics maintained it
was a response to Safeway's harsh stance in labor negotiations, rather
188 Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Am. Intern. Group, Inc. 462 F.3d 121,
129-30 (2d Cir. 2006).
189 See Ideoblog, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/10/the-shareholder.html (Oct.
27, 2006, 07:35) ("It should be obvious to anybody who cares to look past the rhetoric that the
unions are seeking bargaining leverage on behalf of their members, and to ensure their own
survival. They are not seeking to represent the interests of investors generally.") (emphasis in
original).
190 Editorial, Conflicted in California, WALL ST. J., May 11, 2004, at A18 (complaining about

labor's efforts to "hijack" corporate governance for their own ends).
191 See

CalPERS,

Structure

and

Responsibilities,

http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.j sp?bc=/about/organizationboard/structure-responsibilities.xml
(last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
192 CalPERS, Reform Focus List Companies, http://www.calpers-governance.org/alert/focus/
(last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
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than to real concerns about underperformance.1 93 In addition, some

critics have accused CalPERS of using its power to advance the political
194
interests of those who serve on its board.

Despite the potential conflicts between employee-affiliated
shareholders and the other shareholders, commentators have not called
for such shareholders to be deprived of the franchise. And for the most
part, the law has encouraged management and employee ownership of
equity interests in their corporation. In fact, the notion of "pay for
performance" led to the exponential growth of stock options as a
compensation device throughout the 1990s.195 Agency costs would be

reduced and investors would feel more secure, it was argued, if
investors knew that the managers also had their income riding on the
success of the stock. But such shareholders clearly have different
interests than their non-employee counterparts.
F.

The Problem of Sovereign Wealth Funds

Yet another category of shareholder is causing consternation
amongst corporate law theorists. Instead of individuals, companies, or
private funds, these shareholders are in effect countries-political

states. These governmental financial entities, known as sovereign
wealth funds, have recently attracted a fair amount of attention from the
media and from scholars. And there is no real consensus on how they
should be handled.

Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are not a new phenomenon. The
oldest such funds have been around for more than fifty years and have
operated with little attention. 196 Essentially, a sovereign wealth fund is

a fund owned and operated by a country. Unlike state-owned banks or
193 Conflicted in California, supra note 190 ("Ostensibly Calpers is upset about
underperformance, but the real problem seems to be the tough stance the grocery chain took
against labor during a recent strike.").
194 Aaron Lucchetti & Joann S. Lublin, CorporateGovernance: CaIPERS Targets Directors
Who Neglect Holders, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2004, at Cl ("The campaign is being fueled partly
by the political ambitions of Phil Angelides, California's state treasurer and a Calpers board
member, who is considering running for governor of California in 2006."); see also Sundeep
Tucker, 'IdeologicalPuritan' who Alienated by Belligerence: Few People Are Likely to Mourn
DepartureofSean Harrigan,writes Sundeep Tucker, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 2, 2004, at 27
(discussing the firing of former CalPERS president Sean Harrigan for, in part, "going off on
political tangents.").
195 Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It's Not How Much You Pay, But
How, HARV. Bus. REv., May-June 1990, at 138.
196 Robert M. Kinumitt, Public Footprints in Private Markets; Sovereign Wealth Funds and
the World Economy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb. 2008, at 119, available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080101faessay87109/robert-m-kimmitt/public-footprints-inprivate-markets.html (discussing Kuwait's creation of the Kuwait Investment Board to invest its
surplus oil revenue in 1953).
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enterprises, however, SWFs are investment funds that have national
funding and pay their dividends to a state government. Pension funds
can be characterized as SWFs, but they are generally not included
unless they are financed through state commodity exports. 197 The
recent oil boom has given new financial heft to many of these funds, as
has the foreign exchange imbalances caused by the plunging dollar. Oil
has fueled funds in Norway and the Middle East, while currency
reserves have provided much of the funding for China's SWF. 198 These
funds also vary in their investment strategies. Some invest primarily in
government bonds (such as U.S. T-bills), while others have begun to
invest more aggressively in private companies. A few funds have
actually sought to take significant stakes in corporations, while many
others have pursued a quieter strategy of private investment. 99
Estimates place the collective wealth of SWFs at around $2.2 trillionroughly the same as those in hedge funds and private equity funds
200
combined.
The notion of foreign countries investing in private corporations is
troubling to many. The most obvious concern would be a foreign
government taking over a private corporation, particularly one with
links to national security. The United States has erected a system of
oversight for all foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies; such
transactions are reviewed by the Committee on Foreign Investment in
the United States (CFIUS). 20 1 There is an automatic forty-five day
review process whenever a foreign government seeks controlling
interest in a U.S. corporation. 20 2 It was the potential for such a review
that ultimately led China's state oil company to withdraw its bid for
20 3
Unocal.
Control of private corporations by foreign powers, however, is not
the only worry surrounding SWF share ownership. Since SWFs are
controlled by foreign governments, they may have interests other than
those of the traditional private shareholder. In fact, many see a sinister
197 Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate
Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Merchantilism 13 (Stanford Univ. Law & Econ.
Olin Working Paper No. 355, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1095023. Thus, the
Norway Government Pension Fund is characterized as a SWF because it is financed through the
sale of oil, while CaIPERS is not, since it is financed by employee and state contributions.
198 Id.
199 Id.at 14.

200 Press Release, Standard Chartered, Standard Chartered-The Increasing Influence of
2007),
(Oct.
17,
Financial
Markets
Funds
on
Global
Sovereign
Wealth
2 0 0 7 1 0 17
-pl.html (last visited Oct. 21,
http://www.standardchartered.co.th/news/2007/news_
2008).
201 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170 (2007); Memorandum of the President of the United States, Oct. 26,
1988, 53 Fed. Reg. 43999.
202 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170 (2007).
203 Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 197, at 6 n.24 (citing Edmund L. Andrews, China's Oil
Setback: The Politics;Shouted Down, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2005, at C1).

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:2

side to the investments from countries such as Abu Dhabi, Russia, and
China. These countries' funds have recently taken significant stakes in
Citibank, 20 4 the Blackstone Group,20 5 and Advanced Micro Devices, a
chipmaker with Department of Defense contracts. 20 6 These holdings
trigger concerns about security issues, financial issues, and internal
207
governance issues.
There is some discussion of SWF holdings as potential security
risks. But it is hard to see why a SWF acting as a public shareholder
would have any more access to sensitive documents or information than
other shareholders. Instead, the concern is that SWFs will use their
voting power as shareholders to effectuate their governmental agenda,
rather than the agenda of shareholder wealth maximization. 20 8 As one
set of commentators puts it, the threat is that the SWFs will engage in
"strategic behavior-behavior that benefits the SWF or its sovereign
owner in ways that do not proportionately benefit other
shareholders. '' 209 To combat this threat, some have suggested that
SWFs either voluntarily agree not to vote their shares or to disclose how
they voted. 2 10 Others have suggested that the voting power of a SWF's
shares be suspended for as long as the SWF holds the stock.2 11
SWFs are yet another example of shareholders who may have
interests that are deviant from the traditional maximization norm. It is
hard to see, however, why these potentially ulterior motives should
disqualify them from voting. The most distressing potential example is
one in which the SWF uses its voting power to secure favor for its own
domestic industries or companies. 2 12 However, without a controlling
interest, it seems unlikely that the SWF would succeed in effectuating
its policy, especially if it was a blatant rent-seeking endeavor.
204 Stanley Reed, Abu Dhabi's Citigroup Bargain, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Nov. 27, 2007,
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/nov2007/gb2007l127-878991.htm.
205 Keith Bradsher & Joseph Kahn, In China, a Stake in Blackstone Stirs Uncertainty, N.Y.
TIMES, May 29, 2007, at C2.
206 Laurie J. Flynn, Abu Dhabi Takes 8% Stake in Advanced Micro, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17,
2007, at C4.
207 As Ronald Gilson and Curtis Milhaupt have put it, "national security concerns anchor one

end of a continuum of issues concerning when the interests of a foreign government may differ
from those of an ordinary shareholder." Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 197, at 9.
208 Kimmitt, supra note 196 ("SWFs are public-sector entities managing public funds, and
profit maximization may not be considered the primary objective.").
209 Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 197, at 23.
210 Bob Davis, U.S. Pushes Sovereign Funds to Open to Outside Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Feb.
26, 2008, at Al (discussing U.S. Treasury Assistant Secretary Clay Lowery's suggestion that
"sovereign-wealth funds that choose to vote their shares when they take noncontrolling stakes in
U.S. companies should disclose how they voted.").
211 Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 197, at 23-24.
212 See id. at 23 (using the theoretical example of an SWF trying to get the company to
authorize favorable technology transfers to companies in the SWF's jurisdiction). However, as
Gilson and Milhaupt concede, "[lt]o be sure, no one can point to a reported incidence of such
behavior." Id. at 21.
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Assuming the SWF has a significant but far from controlling stake, the
SWF would need to rally the support of a majority of shareholders in
order to effectuate its scheme. The tension would thus resolve itselfeither a majority would fail to sign on, rendering the strategic behavior
moot, or a majority would agree with the SWF that the plan was in their
best interests. Neither event seems to warrant taking away the SWF's
ability to vote. A more realistic concern, perhaps, is that SWFs would
join with other "nontraditional" shareholders (such as union pension
funds and socially responsible investment vehicles) to promote policies
based on political concerns, rather than wealth maximization. 2 13 In the
alternative, SWFs may potentially be more acquiescent to management
in an effort to appear as "passive investors." In such cases, SWFs may
stifle the efforts of more active shareholders to hold management
accountable. 2 14 Ultimately, however, the power of the vote will
determine the appropriate course to take. If a majority of shareholders
willingly chooses a certain result, democratic principles would
215
seemingly require the effectuation of that choice.
Sovereign wealth funds are yet another example of a shareholder
with potential "ulterior" motives.2 16 For some, these potential motives
are so threatening that they counsel for the suspension of SWF voting
rights in the corporation. National security and welfare concerns may
justify restrictions on SWF takeovers and tender offers. Further
restrictions on the franchise, however, seem based less on actual
security concerns and more on the notion of what a true shareholder
should believe. The limitation of SWF voting rights would be yet
another deviation from the standard of "one share, one vote" that is
deigned necessary to protect the underlying principle.21 7

213 Gilson and Milhaupt acknowledge that, if their plan were put into place, other countries
would likely take steps to limit the rights of U.S. government funds, including state pension
funds. These restrictions would limit "the positive impact that shareholder activism by [] state
pension funds, most vocally by CaIPERS, has had on corporate governance standards in other

countries." Id. at 30.
214 Id. at 9 (noting that SWF investments may have been attractive to investment banks
because the SWFs "could act quickly and were thought unlikely either to agitate for change or to
seek control.").
215 There is, of course, the same limitation on interested transactions that applies to controlling
shareholders.
216See Richard A. Epstein & Amanda M. Rose, The Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds: The
Virtues of Going Slow, U. CHI. L. REv. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 16, on file with authors)
(noting that "SWFs are not the only investors who may invest 'strategically'... ").
217As this article was in the editing process, the United States government was making massive

investments in American Insurance Group (AIG) as well as national banks. See Mark Landler &
Eric Dash, Drama Behind a Banking Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2008, at Al; Edmund L.
Andrews et al., Fed in an $85 Billion Rescue of an Insurer Near Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16,
at
available
Al,
at
2008,

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/17/business/I7insure.html?_r= 1&partner=rssnyt&oref-slogin.
The role that the United States' "emergency SWF" will play in corporate affairs has yet to be

CA RDOZO LAW RE VIE W

492

G.

[Vol. 30:2

The Problem ofDefining "Wealth Maximization"

The assumption behind the "one share, one vote" norm is that
shareholders have a uniform interest in wealth maximization. Since all
shareholders are entitled to part of the residual, they all have an interest
in maximizing the size of that residual. The notion that shareholder
wealth maximization is not only a goal for the corporation, but in fact
the only legitimate goal, has become the dominant normative theory of
the corporation. Indeed, Hansmann and Kraakman have proclaimed the
primacy of this view: "[t]here is no longer any serious competitor to the
view that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term
shareholder value."21 8
As shown above, this assumption is not empirically correct.
However, even assuming a mass of shareholders with no other
complications or interests, there are still difficulties in implementing the
notion of shareholder wealth maximization. The main problem is:
when? What is the time horizon for wealth maximization? Hansmann
and Kraakman specify "long-term shareholder value" but do not define
it. And in fact, shareholders have radically different time horizons for
the "maximization" of their shareholder wealth. 21 9 There may be some
shareholders who buy the stock at the IPO and hold it until it passes to
their heirs and assignees. But there are other shareholders who hold the
stock for a day, a week, a month. There are some shareholders who also
have options-they want to max out on the stock at the option exercise
date.220 There are some shareholders who must sell the share once it
drops out of a particular index. 22' There are some shareholders who
have yearly or quarterly profit margins to meet, and they need the stock
to rise to meet those horizons. There are some shareholders who buy
determined. But these investments raise some of the same concerns that apply to SWF
investments.
218 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 66, at 439.
219 See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About IncreasingShareholder Power, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 561, 579-83 (2006) (discussing the different financial interests of short-term and long-term
shareholders).
220 And they want to get the option at the stock's lowest point. Many companies have been
accused of gaming the system by backdating the option's strike date to a day with a lower price.
For a discussion of the backdating scandal, see David I. Walker, Unpacking Backdating:
Economic Analysis and Observationson the Stock Option Scandal,87 B.U. L. REV. 561 (2007).
221 Index funds track a particular index; they must manage the fund to mirror the composition
of the index. See Shimon B. Edelstein, Note, Indexing Capital Gainsfor Inflation: The Impacts
of Recent Inflation Trends, Mutual Fund FinancialIntermediation,and Information Technology,
65 BROOK. L. REV. 783, 811-12 (1999) (discussing index funds); Peter N. Hall, Note, Bucking the
Trend: The Unsupportability of Index Providers' Imposition of Licensing Fees for Unlisted
Trading of Exchange Traded Funds, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1125, 1126 (2004) (describing the
composition of exchange traded funds, which may track certain indices by having a sampling of
stock from a particular index).
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the stock looking to take it over, and then either buy all of the stock or
walk away; other shareholders buy the stock on a bet that the takeover
attempt will succeed.
Ultimately, shareholders may have very different notions of what
"wealth maximization" means. Let us take, for example, a corporation
whose shares have been trading at $35.
A takeover firm offers
shareholders $45 for the stock. The board believes that if this tender
offer is fought, shareholders will eventually get $50 for their shares
within two months.
Or, the board believes that technology in
development will eventually lead the stock to be worth $100 two years
from now, if the current management remains in place. However, if the
technology fails, the shares will be worth only $20. What is the best
path towards wealth maximization? Believers in a strong efficient
capital markets hypothesis will argue that the $45 is the best choice, as
will short-term shareholders. But shareholders with a medium-term
horizon may want the board to resist and shoot for $50 per share. Those
with even longer term horizons may hope the board fights off the offer
entirely and remains in place, shooting for the $100 share price down
the road.
Because uncertainties multiply as the time horizon lengthens,
shareholder primacy becomes more and more meaningless as it
stretches from short to long. Paying high wages to employees or
corporate management can be justified based on retention of key talent
or reduction in turnover. Customer goodwill justifies slashed prices or
expensive research and development. As one commentator has argued,
"the mantra of [shareholder wealth] maximization has no distinctive
meaning and policy implications if it is not interpreted to mean
maximization of short-term value. '' 222 However, maximization of shortterm shareholder value leads to short-time horizons that can cripple
business planning and stability.
Moreover, a short-term focus
encourages corporate fraud and misreporting designed to bolster the
223
stock price now (with the possibly bad consequences to come later).
In addition, shareholders with a diversified portfolio have different
interests than shareholders with most of their wealth tied up in one
company. 224 Fully diversified shareholders, who have been referred to
as "universal owners," 225 have a stake in corporate success as a whole.
Their notion of wealth maximization will be quite different from a
shareholder who has invested entirely in a particular company. Scholars

222 Margaret M. Blair, Directors' Duties in a Post-Enron World: Why Language Matters, 38
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 885, 890 (2003).
223 Bodie, AOL Time Warner, supra note 186, at 997-98.
224 Anabtawi, supra note 219, at 583-85.
225 JAMES P. HAWLEY & ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY CAPITALISM 3, 21

(2000).
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have argued that portfolio shareholders prefer a policy of portfolio value
maximization, rather than individual firm value maximization. 226 In
contrast, undiversified shareholders have an incentive to oppose
transactions that maximize wealth for all shareholders (by increasing the
value of one firm by more than the decrease in value at the
shareholders' firm). 227 Professors Ribstein and Kobayashi have used
this argument in support of a 'hands-off approach to vote selling and
buying. 228 According to this view, vote buying may be necessary to
allow diversified shareholders to pull off transactions that actually hurt
shareholders at the company. The portfolio shareholders would buy the
votes necessary to carry off the transaction as long as the transaction
229
creates overall positive value for the portfolio.
The notion of maximization of portfolio value strikes at the heart
of the shareholder primacy norm. Under this theory, social wealth will
not be maximized if each firm seeks to maximize returns for its own
shareholders. Instead, social wealth depends not on the actions of
individual companies, but on the actions of all companies in the
economy. What this means is that in some instances, it would be more
efficient (on a societal level) for a company to do something that
decreased its own shareholders' wealth. Yet directors would be
violating their fiduciary duties if they went forward with the transaction,
since it would harm the company's shareholders. This example
demonstrates yet another axis on which shareholders split into different
groups based on different interests.
H.

The Problem of "CorporateSocial Responsibility"

Finally, we must consider the possibility that shareholders will, in
fact, choose something other than wealth maximization as their goal for
the corporation. The goal of wealth maximization is assumed, on both
descriptive and normative grounds, to be the sole corporate purpose that
shareholders desire. Descriptively, shareholders are assumed to be
rational actors, and thus are assumed to desire the maximization of their
utility. Although scholars recognize that utility can come in many
forms, the role of "shareholder" is seen as easily translatable into a
wealth-based utility model. In other words, since shareholders invest
money in stock in order to make more money (through dividends and
226 Robert G. Hansen & John R. Lott, Jr., Externalities and Corporate Objectives in a World
with Diversified Shareholder/Consumers,31 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 43, 44 (1996).
227 Id.

228 Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Outsider Trading as an Incentive Device, 40
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 21, 44-45 (2006).
229 Id. at 44 (noting that such "costly manipulation" may be useful in overcoming
"interference from self-interested managers or undiversified shareholders.").
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appreciation of stock price), their utility in holding the stock is derived
solely from the financial appreciation of the stock. This reality is also
normatively the optimal outcome, since (as economic theory provides)
self-interested shareholders will push to maximize the corporation's
residual profits, which in turn will maximize the social wealth generated
by the corporation.
While many have questioned the normative story of shareholder
wealth maximization, it has been assumed to correctly portray the
reality of shareholder interests. However, there is increasing evidence
that not all shareholders maximize their utility through a program of
shareholder wealth maximization. Instead, some shareholders may gain
utility through lower profits but higher levels of some other good.
There are a few anecdotal episodes of this occurring at individual
companies. For example, a number of Disney shareholders hold the
stock because of their fondness for Disney animation, particularly the
historical works such as Bambi and Snow White. 230 These shareholders
supported the efforts of Roy Disney, the nephew of Walt Disney, to
restore and maintain the company's tradition of animation and family
entertainment. 231 Many of these shareholders attend annual meetings in
order to celebrate their association with the company. 232 And they may
have played an important role in the no confidence vote against Michael
Eisner in 2004, in which 43% of shareholders voted to withhold their
votes from him. 233 Eisner had angered some traditionalists by
diversifying Disney's holdings and failing to continue Disney's
234
animation successes of the 1990s.
Beyond these individual instances there is a larger phenomenon
under the rubric of "corporate social responsibility" (CSR). The CSR
movement seeks to bring social, ideological, or political principles
beyond profit maximization to bear on corporate decision-making.
Proponents of the movement believe that corporations bear social
responsibility for their actions beyond what the law may require. And
230 See, e.g., Frank Ahrens, Roy Disney's Quest, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2004, at Al (noting
that Disney stock "is widely held by individual shareholders"); Peter J. Howe, Shareholders Hold
Key to the Kingdom, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 3, 2004, at D1 (describing "hundreds of thousands of
Disney fanatics who also own stock"); Sarah McBride, Mice That Roar: Obsessive Fans Join
Disney Proxy Fight, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2004, at Al ("[H]ardcore Disney fans own stock in the
object of their devotion. Those stakes may be just a few shares apiece, but multiplied by
thousands of fans across the county, they help make Disney one of the most widely held stocks on
Main Street.").
231 Howe, supra note 230.
232 JAMES B. STEWART, DISNEY WAR 508 (2005) (discussing the thousands of shareholders
who attended the 2004 shareholders meeting).
233 Kenneth N. Gilpin, Disney Dissidents Rebuke Eisner, Denying Him 43% of Vote,
NYTIMES.COM, Mar. 3, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/03/business/media/03CNDDISN.html?ex= 1222488000&en=493365dc8d9d34dd&ei=5070.
234 See id. ("During the course of his remarks, Roy Disney suggested that under Mr. Eisner's
direction the Disney name and its products had lost their luster and unique character.").
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they seek to influence corporate behavior so that concerns such as
workers' rights, environment, poverty, and illness become factors in
management's calculus.
As individuals, most shareholders do not generally have sufficient
power to justify the time and energy required to vote their shares
according to their overall social utility, as opposed to just their wealth.
Increasingly, however, investors are putting their money into "socially
responsible" funds-funds that invest in companies that meet certain
social responsibilities targets or thresholds. 235 By the end of 2005,
approximately $2.3 trillion was invested in funds targeted towards
socially responsible companies, up from $635 billion in 1995.236 Such
funds often underperform the market as a whole. 237 However, their
popularity attests to the desires of some investors to promote companies
that adhere to certain principles beyond wealth maximization. As the
number of socially responsible funds increases, investment houses are
diversifying the types of such funds to appeal to a broader variety of
investors. Along with funds favoring companies based on labor or
environmental policies, there are funds that invest based on Catholic
social teaching as well as funds that invest in companies based on the
money that those companies give to Democratic candidates. 238
Socially responsible investing is just a small share of the market
now, and it may be that the overwhelming desire of most shareholders is
simple wealth maximization. But it may also be that the new era of
socially responsible consumerism and investing, when coupled with the
shareholder democracy movement, will lead shareholders to support
policies that do not directly correlate with wealth maximization. In the
end, a system based on and legitimated by shareholder control must
admit the possibility that shareholders may choose not to maximize
profits. 239 If shareholders choose this route more frequently, a
normative theory that justifies the shareholder vote based on the
efficiency of shareholder wealth maximization may in fact find that the
shareholder vote is no longer the best tool for achieving shareholder
235 See Henry Blodget, The ConscientiousInvestor, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2007, at 78.
236 Jeff Brown, Save the Earth Sacrifice Your Returns?, WASH. POST, May 13, 2007, at FO 1.
Of course, this may be so because "performance" is measured along one metric-profitabilitythat fails to capture additional investor or societal utility generated by investment in such funds.
237 Id. ("For the 12 months ended April 30, for example, such funds investing in big-company
stocks returned 11.63 percent, compared with 12.28 percent for all big-stock funds. For funds
investing in mid-size companies, socially minded versions returned 7.65 percent over the period,
compared with 10.24 percent for all funds.").
238 Id.; see also Blodget, supra note 235, at 80-82 (discussing the categorization difficulties of
socially responsible investing).
239 Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in CorporateGovernance, 81 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1431, 1433 (2006) ("Managers can promote shareholders' interests without
maximizing profits to the extent the shareholders have some objective other than profit

maximization.").
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I.

The Problem of Market Hegemony

The norm of shareholder wealth maximization may actually reveal
a shortcoming in the application of economic theory of shareholder
240
Most
voting (and many other aspects of commercial behavior).
economic models, for example, treat profit maximization as the sole
objective of corporations; non-market values are to be (appropriately)
ignored. 24 1 And indeed, there is plenty of evidence that most
corporations really do make decisions based on these profit-maximizing
243
considerations. 242 Shareholders tend to vote on those considerations.
Consumers, too, tend to focus on bottom-line considerations when
making their marketplace decisions. Factors such as price and product
quality tend to dominate consumer choice; the "social values" of the
corporations figures little, if it all, in those decisions.2 44 Everyone, it
seems, focuses on the bottom line when acting in market contexts. This
is in marked contrast, by the way, to how people behave in political
elections-indeed, it has been suggested that people's votes in political
elections are driven by generalized "values" while their votes in the
'245
marketplace are driven by individual "tastes.
Markets, then, are hegemonic: people act for personal gain, and
other values are only reflected in what they do with that gain. 246 Both
proponents and critics of markets agree on this point-their
disagreement turns on whether this is a good or a bad thing. 247 Either
way, however, economic theory should be able to account for the fact of
market hegemony. The traditional explanation is that acting on nonmarket values (social values, prejudices) is costly, and market
240 Much of the thinking in this subsection draws upon the thinking of Stephen Ellis, Market
Hegemony andEconomic Theory, PHIL. SOC. SC. (forthcoming 2008).
241 See, e.g., Norman P. Barry, Do Corporations Have Any Responsibility Beyond Making a
MARKETS
&
MORALITY
100
(2000),
available
at
Profit?,
3
J.
Patrick Primeaux &
http://www.acton.org/publications/mandm/mandm-controversy_21.php;
John Steiber, Profit Maximization: The Ethical Mandate of Business, 13 J. BUS. ETHICS 287
(1994).
242 See, e.g., Sandra E. Black & Elizabeth Brainerd, Importing Inequality? The Impact of
Globalization on Gender Discrimination, 57 INDuS. & LAB. REL. REV. 540 (2004); Ann
Schwartz-Miller & Wayne K. Talley, Motor Bus Deregulation and the Gender Wage Gap: A Test
of the Becker Hypothesis, 26 E. ECON. J. 145 (2000).
243 See Ellis, supra note 240.
244 Lois A. Mohr, Deborah J. Webb & Katherine E. Harris, Do Consumers Expect Companies
to be Socially Responsible? The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on Buying Behavior,
35 J. CONSUMER AFF. 45, 67 (2001).
245 See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1970).

246 See Ellis, supra note 240.
247 See id.
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competition drives out high-cost competitors. 248 But this is just bad
economics. Standard economic theory tells us that markets should
reflect consumer values, not shape them. And those preferences, taken
as given, show that people care about a large variety of things, many of
which are not self-focused. 249 While economic theory does a good job
explaining what happens when people act solely on bottom line
considerations, this just shows that the theory presupposes market
hegemony, not that it explains it.
Standard economic theory may not give a good account of market
hegemony because it posits that people are consulting all of their desires
and beliefs when making decisions. In other words, their utility
functions are univocal and fixed (or, to the extent they change, they
change slowly). 250 For that reason, economic theory lacks the resources
to explain why, for example, people appear to consult their "otherregarding" values in some (non-market) situations and not in other
(market) situations. The "on-again, off again" nature of people's
preferences is also unlikely to be adequately captured by some of the
basic extensions of economics, like the various versions of the multipleselves model. 251 A more convincing extension of economics, however,
is one that posits that people do not consult their entire set of
preferences when making decisions, but instead rely on a proper subset
of their interests. 252 This would account for the highly contextual nature
of action generally, and further explain why people seem to be attending
to only bottom-line considerations when making decisions in market
contexts.
Perhaps this just confirms what was discussed above: that
restricting voting rights to shareholders drives the wealth maximization
norm rather than the other way around. When people are voting as
shareholders, they are acting in one of those market contexts that
activate all of their bottom-line desires and not their other values. Just
as looking at a glass of cold water may focus one's attention on his
thirst, staring at a prospectus may make one focus on a corporation's
profitability. A shareholder's interaction with a corporation, in other
words, is structured in such a way that naturally leads to a focus on
profit maximization. It does not, however, tell us that shareholders or
others do not have non-pecuniary interests in the corporation-those
interests are just not being adequately reflected in the corporate voting
scheme.

248 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 109-10 (2d ed. 1982).

249 See Ellis, supra note 240.
250 See Grant M. Hayden & Stephen E. Ellis, Law and Economics After Behavioral
Economics, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 629 (2007).
251 See id.
252 See id.
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IV.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF HETEROGENEITY

The notion of shareholder homogeneity is critical to the normative
premise behind "one share, one vote."
Easterbrook and Fischel
emphasized that shareholders are likely to have "similar if not identical"
interests because "the shareholders of a given firm at a given time are a
reasonably homogenous group. '253 This homogeneity has several
beneficial effects. First, it gives all shareholders an equal incentive to
monitor agency costs so as to reduce such costs for all shareholders. 2 54
If shareholders have different interests, they will have different
incentives to reduce agency costs incurred by the corporate form.
Second, shareholders with the same interests will have the same
objectives for the firm. This consistency of purpose will prevent the
firm from becoming a war zone of competing preferences. Easterbrook
and Fischel, along with others, have argued that this consistency
amongst voter preferences is the key to the stability and prosperity of
255
the corporate form.
Moreover, shareholder homogeneity would solve the interpersonal
utility problem discussed in Part I. In a democratic state, voting
systems based on "one person, one vote" assume that each person has
an equal interest and set of preferences to be expressed in the election.
This assumption is almost certainly incorrect. 256 With shares, however,
we can define each person's interests and preferences in a corporate
election as the number of shares that they hold. Like landowners in a
"one acre, one vote" water district, shareholders have an interest in the
company that is clearly defined: it is the percentage of the residual they
are entitled to based on the number of shares they hold. If we define a
shareholder's utility as the interest in the residual, a shareholder's
voting power is perfectly correlated with her interest in the residual.
We know, however, that shareholders are not, in fact, homogenous.
As discussed above, 257 all of the following types of shareholders have
interests beyond the residual: majority shareholders, shareholders with
disproportionate voting rights, members of voting trusts, bribed
253 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 70.
254 Martin & Partnoy, supra note 9, at 776 (noting that the notion of "one share, one vote" is
based on "agency costs considerations"); Robert H. Sitkoff, CorporatePoliticalSpeech, Political
Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1121 (2002)
(noting that any rule other than one share, one vote "wastefully increases the agency costs
associated with the corporate form.").
255 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 69-70; see also HENRY HANSMANN, THE
OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 62 (1996) ("Investor-owned firms have the important advantage that
their owners generally share a single well-defined objective: to maximize the net present value of
the firm's earnings.").
256 Hayden, False Promise,supra note 22, at 236-47.
257 See supra Part It1.

CARDOZO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 30:2

shareholders, hedged shareholders, sovereign wealth funds, and
employee and management shareholders. In each case, the shareholder
has interests that threaten to override the shareholder's individual
interest in the residual.
Moreover, shareholder heterogeneity is not simply a matter of
shareholders with discrete competing interests.
There is also
heterogeneity amongst shareholders with respect to their definition of
wealth maximization. As discussed above, the definition of wealth
maximization can be quite different for different shareholders. There is
the time horizon issue: at what point is wealth to be maximized? A
hedge fund looking for a quick return is different than an index fund
looking to stay in the stock as long as it is listed. There is also the
question of the diversified portfolio: to what extent is the shareholder
seeking to maximize this individual stock or, instead, maximize the
entire portfolio? This divide has led some commentators to suggest a
normative system of portfolio wealth maximization, rather than share
wealth maximization. 258 Correspondingly, shareholders have different
risk preferences and may have different tastes for the corporation's
approach to risk based on the ratio of their holdings in the individual
firm compared to their overall holdings. 259 Shareholders might agree on
the goal of wealth maximization and might also share risk and time
horizon preferences, but they still might very well disagree about
260
choices the corporation makes in these areas.
Furthermore, the notion that shareholders have a shared interest in
wealth maximization is a simplifying assumption. Shareholders are
heterogeneous with respect to their utility preferences in that these
preferences do not match up directly with wealth. Shareholders-when
assessed as individual people-all have individual utility preferences
258 Hansen & Lott, supra note 226; see also Daniel J.H. Greenwood, FictionalShareholders:
For Whom Are CorporateManagers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1021, 1056 (1996)
(discussing the differences between the "corporate law" fictional shareholder and the "portfolio

investor" shareholder).
259 For example, an investor who owns $50,000 in stock in company A and has $100,000
overall in his portfolio will have different risk preferences for the firm than will a shareholder
who has $50,000 in stock in company A and has $10 million overall in her portfolio. The
declining marginal utility of wealth also means that the performance of company A has less effect
on the utility of the second shareholder utility, even though both shareholders have the same
number of shares.
260 For example, Hewlett-Packard shareholders recently battled over the wisdom of the merger
between Hewlett-Packard and Compaq. Michael Brick & Steve Lohr, Fiorina Claims Victory in
Hewlett-Compaq Proxy Battle, NYTIMES.COM,
Mar.
19,
2002,
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/19/business/19CNDVOTE.html?ex=1224734400&en=dbfff985a48bb0d8&ei=5070. Hewlett-Packard director Walter
Hewlett battled the rest of the company's board and management over the merger, ultimately
losing in a close election. Both sides agreed that the merger should be judged on its impact of
Hewlett-Packard's success, but they disagreed about whether the merger would help accomplish
that goal. Hewlett and the company spent an estimated $100 million in their efforts to persuade
shareholders. Id.
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that go beyond maximization of one's wealth. In their role as
shareholder, individuals may put these interests aside and focus solely
on wealth maximization. But as the growth of socially responsible
investing demonstrates, shareholders may find room to seek non-wealth
utility in the corporate setting.
If it seems far-fetched that most shareholders have such
heterogeneity, it is only because shareholders in publicly-held
companies have no avenues for displaying such heterogeneity. The
panoply of shareholder concerns and interests are on constant display in
closely-held corporations: there are conflicts over dividend schedules,
management staffing, executive salaries, corporate culture, and product
development. When shareholders have real power to change corporate
policy, they exercise this power in a variety of ways. However, noncontrolling shareholders in public corporations cannot generally
26 1
effectuate changes in corporate policy through their power to vote.
The miniscule voting power held by most properly diversified
shareholders is only part of the problem. In board of directors elections,
shareholders only have a choice if an opposition slate is running against
the incumbent board. Such a campaign would require the opposition to
invest in expensive proxy materials and disclosure. 262 If there is no
opposition, then the shareholder's vote has no effect on the corporate
leadership structure.
Thus, the notion of a monolithic shareholder primacy norm is
effectuated not by shareholder democracy, but instead by shareholder
apathy. Shareholders in a public company have long been divorced
from real control of the firm. 263 Thus, most shareholders in public
companies are rationally uninterested in exercising their voting in an
informed manner. The time and costs associated with researching how
best to exercise their preferences would greatly outweigh the utility they
would gain from voting in a largely meaningless election. As such,
most shareholders will not become properly informed and thus will not
use the vote to further their disparate interests. Instead, share voters
generally tend to follow the directions of the board and management,
264
when they bother to vote at all.
Shareholders' inability to exercise their control rights results in a
power vacuum at the center of the firm. The incumbent board and
management are well-placed to occupy that vacuum. The shareholder
primacy norm acts as a counterweight on behalf of the shareholders-a

261 Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise,93 VA. L. REV. 675, 682-94
(2007) (describing the lack of effective shareholder voting power).
262 Id. at 688-91 (discussing how proxy costs may run to "hundreds of thousands of dollars.").
263 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1.

264 See, e.g., Listokin, supra note 137, at 13-14 (noting that "management sponsored proposals
typically pass easily," with a mean approval rate of 85 percent).
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norm that the board and management are expected to follow for the
benefit of the shareholders. But it is important to remember that the
norm of shareholder wealth maximization is a fictional placeholder
265 If
developed to replace the actual interests of the shareholders.
shareholders truly expressed their preferences through their votes, there
would be no need for the norm of residual maximization. Instead, the
board and management would be expected to follow the actual
preferences of shareholders, rather than simply a presumed wealth
maximization preference.
Thus, we see the strange cycle that Easterbrook and Fischel,
among others, have used to justify shareholders as the sole franchisees.
Shareholders, we are told, will single-mindedly focus on increasing the
residual as their sole preference for corporate policy. Because it is in
the interests of all corporate stakeholders that the residual be
maximized, we should give power to those who have a single-minded
focus on such an outcome. 266 However, this single-minded focus is
simply an assumption.
And in reality, the varying interests of
shareholders do not comport with the notion of a shareholder electorate
with one homogenized goal. Thus, neither the means nor the ends hold
up: shareholders will not all have the same preferences, and thus they
will not all seek to effectuate those standards in lock-step voting
patterns.
It is for this reason that the shareholder primacy norm has been
described as a tool for constraining horizontal conflict amongst
shareholders, rather than a tool for maintaining shareholder power over
other corporate stakeholders. As Gordon Smith has described, the
shareholder primacy norm developed as a response to minority
oppression. 267
The oppression doctrine prevents the controlling
shareholder from pursuing her own individual interests; she instead
must seek to maximize the value of the shares of the corporation as a
whole. In this way, the controlling shareholder is constrained against
following her own (heterogeneous) interests and must look to benefit all
shareholders equally. 268 The "shareholder primacy" norm, accompanied
by equitable anti-oppression doctrine, is necessary because the power of
the franchise will not mitigate this problem; in fact, it is the cause of the
problem. The shareholder primacy norm is, in effect, a way of forcing
homogeneity onto a very diverse set of shareholder interests.
Viewed this way, the shareholder franchise is not justified on the
grounds of its own preference for wealth maximization. Instead, the
265 Greenwood, supra note 258, at 1052 ("For fictional shareholders, whatever else the people
behind them may want, all want to maximize the value of their shares.").
266 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 403.
267 Smith, supra note 115.
268 Id.
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shareholder franchise is simply one tool in the corporate law arsenal for
enforcing the norm of shareholder wealth maximization. 269 Presumably,
there are some issues on which most or even all shareholders would
agree, and thus the vote allows shareholders to exercise collective

power over the composition of the board or the completion of a certain
transaction. However, the shareholder primacy norm is about more than
just the vote. The norm is indifferent or even hostile to the preferences
of actual shareholders. Instead, the norm assumes that shareholders all
prefer wealth maximization and then requires the corporation to be run
270
accordingly.
Because shareholder preferences are irrelevant to shareholder
primacy, true shareholder democracy is actually a threat to the
shareholder wealth maximization norm. If let loose to express their
actual preferences, shareholders might express their preferences for a
271
variety of interests beyond shareholder wealth maximization.
Perhaps this explains the recent move of scholars such as Stephen
Bainbridge, who supports the goal of shareholder wealth maximization
but argues against greater shareholder input. 272 Bainbridge bases his
argument primarily on the need for centralized and largely unreviewable
273
discretion in order to maximize efficient business operations.
According to Bainbridge, shareholders should only have limited voting
rights: "shareholder voting is properly understood not as a primary
component of the corporate decision-making structure, but rather as an
'274
accountability device of last resort, to be used sparingly, at most.
269 Stephen M. Bainbridge, DirectorPrimacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV.
L. REv. 1735, 1750 (2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director Primacy] ("Like many
intracorporate contracts, however, the shareholder wealth maximization norm does not easily lend
itself to judicial enforcement except in especially provocative situations. Instead, it is enforced
indirectly through a complex and varied set of extrajudicial accountability mechanisms, of which
shareholder voting is one.").
270 Greenwood, supra note 258, at 1052 ("It follows, then, that the separation of ownership
and control is not a vaguely illegitimate deprivation of the rightful prerogatives of ownership, but
rather a supremely sensible application of the division of labor."); id. at 1053 ("We have come
then to a solution to the shareholder puzzle. The fictional shareholder reduces politics to
administration.").
271 Id. at 1052-53 ("If the corporation were run by and for real people, it would be a hotbed of
political controversy. . . . If the real people disagree with the fictional representation, the real
people may simply be disregarded as not real shareholders.").
272 See, e.g., Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 269; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Means
and Ends, supra note 69.
273 Bainbridge, DirectorPrimacy, supra note 269, at 1749 ("Active investor involvement in
corporate decisionmaking seems likely to disrupt the very mechanism that makes the widely held
public corporation practicable: namely, the centralization of essentially nonreviewable
decisionmaking authority in the board of directors. The chief economic virtue of the public
corporation is . . . that it provides a hierarchical decisionmaking structure well-suited to the
problem of operating a large business enterprise with numerous employees, managers,
shareholders, creditors, and other constituencies.").
274 Id. at 1750. According to Bainbridge, this limited right is negotiated through contract. Id.
("[S]hareholders have certain contractual rights, which include the requirement that directors
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Instead, the corporation requires "the centralization of essentially
'275
nonreviewable decision-making authority in the board of directors.
As long as the directors operate within the shareholder wealth
maximization norms, their decisions in leading the company will be left
alone.
Shareholders have a diverse set of competing interests. The right
to vote provides a mechanism for shareholders to express those interests
vis-d-vis the actual control of the company. In reality, however, only
shareholders in closely-held companies have the power and incentives
to vote their preferences. In the absence of actual expressions of
preferences, the shareholder wealth maximization norm serves as a
theoretical stand-in for shareholder preferences. But this norm is just
that-a stand-in. If corporate law theory justifies the shareholder
franchise based on a homogenous, uniform interest in increasing the
residual, it is based on a fiction. In reality, shareholders have a
heterogeneous set of interests that are muted only because of the
weakness of the shareholder franchise. A stronger form of shareholder
democracy would, in all likelihood, exacerbate these divisions by
providing more expression for actual preferences. A true shareholder
democracy, then, would not reflect the vision of a single-minded
electorate pursuing the goal of residual maximization to the benefit of it.
It would instead reflect what it really is: control of the corporation by
one group of stakeholders.

CONCLUSION

Democracies, both political and corporate, have developed voting
systems designed to translate individual preferences into institutional
choices. Political democracies typically tie the right to vote to the level
of a person's interest in the outcome of the election. People with any
type of strong interest in a governmental institution are typically granted
the right to vote so long as there is some manageable way to identify
them. Corporate democracies, on the other hand, tend to define the
requisite institutional interest quite narrowly, and thus restrict the right
to vote to shareholders alone. This restriction has found its justification
in the assumption that shareholders have a homogeneous interest in
corporate wealth maximization.
Such homogeneity, it is argued,
maximizes efficient preference satisfaction.
maximize shareholder wealth as their principal decisionmaking norm."). However, to the extent
that corporations are creatures of state law, Bainbridge's contractual analysis fails to justify
shareholders as the sole participants in the corporate franchise as set by state law.
275 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L.
REv. 601, 626 (2006).
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Unfortunately, the assumption of shareholder homogeneity and
many of the conclusions drawn from it are false. It is becoming
increasingly clear, for example, that shareholders have many different
types of interests in a corporation. In addition, stakeholders such as
employees, consumers, and creditors also have interests in corporate
governance that are not currently captured through existing contractual
regimes.
Moreover, many of the conclusions drawn from the
assumption of shareholder homogeneity are either based on dated
understandings of social choice theory or, in some cases, are flat out
inconsistent with the standard economic theory that they purport to
embody. As a result, corporate voting schemes are sterile counterparts
of their more robust political counterparts.
Because of the theoretical weaknesses of the traditional
justifications for "one share, one vote" and the shareholder franchise,
corporate law scholars need to reconsider our foundational conceptions
We must consider both proxy strength and
of the corporation.
manageability in determining whether the right to vote would be a
proper expression of utility interests by a particular class of
We should consider both categorical and temporal
stakeholders.
dimensions of voting rights in making our determinations. 276 To be true
to social utility, we must allow for the expression of monetary and nonmonetary utility in our preference aggregation. Finally, we must
consider how interests and preferences can be expressed and protected
through the entire corporate structure. As noted in Part I, whether one
votes or not is just the initial question. The meaning of the vote is
defined by what is being voted on, what percentage of votes is required
to take action, and the preferences and interests of other voters in the
election. Although the corporate polity is generally constructed as a
majority vote of shareholders as to each position on the board, there are
a number of ways in which the polity could be reconstructed to measure
preferences.
These are only initial considerations, which we intend to pursue in
future works. But we hope they will begin a reconsideration of the
theory behind the shareholder franchise commensurate with its current
rebirth in practice.

276 In looking at various interests, there will be a temptation to consider a static model, in
which various factions are constantly pitched in the midst of the same battles. However, interests
change over time and depending on the situation. Different corporate factions will have different
arrays of alliances. Perhaps even more importantly, the identities and preferences of the
stakeholders themselves will change over time. Voting in the corporate context must be
considered over time, rather than through a one-round model. Cf Adam B. Cox, The Temporal
Dimension of Voting Rights, 93 VA. L. REv. 361, 364 (2007) (rejecting the position that "a
narrow temporal frame is required for evaluating voting rights claims").

